The decision to terminate the serial production of su 2. Legendary aircraft

In the second half of 1936, on the instructions of the Main Directorate of the Aviation Industry (GUAP), the design teams of N.N. Polikarpova, I.G. Nemana, S.V. Ilyushin, S.A. Kogerigina, D.P. Grigorovich and P.O. Sukhoi conducted preliminary research on the projects of reconnaissance attack aircraft with the AM-34FRN piston engine.

The SUAI Commission reviewed the projects and came to the conclusion that they "... differ very little from each other in terms of their geometric dimensions, weight and flight performance data", and considered it expedient to build an aircraft in three design options: duralumin, based on American technologies, wooden and mixed. For each of the options, the chief designers were appointed: P.O. Sukhoi (factory No. 156, Moscow), I.G. Neman (factory No. 135, Kharkov) and N.N. Polikarpov (plant number 21, Gorky).

The proposal of the commission was approved by the country's leadership, and on December 27, 1936, a resolution of the Council of Labor and Defense (STO) "On the construction of a high-speed long-range reconnaissance attack aircraft" was issued, later mentioned in correspondence under the code "Ivanov".

Continuing work on the topic, at the beginning of 1937 P.O. Sukhoi redesigned the project for the M-62 air-cooled engine, as it was more reliable in combat conditions. In the design of the new aircraft, extruded profiles, stamped and cast power units from aluminum alloys, flexible textolite, and the use of the plasma-template method made it possible to simplify the manufacture of the aircraft and made it possible for its mass production in-line. The project received the in-plant designation SZ ("Stalin's task").

The development and construction of a prototype was carried out in a record short time - 6 months. August 25, 1937 M.M. Gromov lifted into the air the first copy of the SZ-1 aircraft. Factory tests with interruptions caused by engine breakdowns continued until the end of 1938. The aircraft was not transferred to state tests due to the ban on the operation of M-62 engines.

In December 1937, the construction of the “understudy” (SZ-2) was completed, the aircraft made its first flight on January 29. By order of the People's Commissariat of the Defense Industry, in January 1938, the SZ-2 was transferred to joint tests with the Air Force, which were carried out in Evpatoria, Yu.A. participated in them from the Air Force Research Institute. Makarov and K.A. Kalilec. The tests were completed on March 26, the aircraft turned out to be successful and was recommended for serial construction.

For various reasons, "Ivanov" I.G. The Neman was not completed, and N.N. Polikarpov took to the air only at the end of 1938. This meant that "Ivanov" P.O. Sukhoi was the winner of an unannounced competition. After the completion of state tests, the SZ-2 entered the plant number 156 to replace the engine, which had exhausted its resource. Only a few flights were made with the new engine, and on August 3 the plane crashed, the cause of which was the destruction of the M-62 engine.

The third copy of the SZ-3 aircraft with the M-87 engine was lifted into the air on November 17, 1938 by test pilot A.P. Chernavsky. After factory tests and refinements, the SZ-3 was transferred to state tests, which ended in early April 1939. According to its flight characteristics, the aircraft fully satisfied the Air Force, a high technical culture of the machine and good flight data were noted. In March 1939, even before the completion of state tests, the people's commissars for defense and the aviation industry turned to the Defense Committee (KO) under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR with a request to accept the Ivanov aircraft with the M-87A engine into service with the Red Army and organize its mass production. The decision to choose a serial plant was greatly delayed, only at the end of July 1939, after the approval of the pilot aircraft building plan for 1939-40 by the NKAP, at the plant in Kharkov, they began preparing for the serial production of the aircraft under the designation BB-1 ( short-range bomber - the first). At the same time, P.O. Sukhoi was appointed Chief Designer of Plant No. 135.

Unlike prototypes, the production aircraft had a mixed design (the fuselage was a wooden monocoque with plywood sheathing, the wing and stabilizer were metal). The latter was explained in detail by the fact that the USSR still did not have enough metal for a large series of all-metal aircraft.

In 1940, the BB-1 (from December 1940 - Su-2), having undergone a number of improvements, began to be produced with the M-88, M-88B engines, and the last production aircraft, about 60 copies, had the M-82 engine.

In addition, in 1940, factories No. 31 in Taganrog and No. 207 in Dolgoprudny were connected to the production of the aircraft. In total, until the spring of 1942, 910 Su-2 aircraft were produced.

In the period 1939-41. in parallel with mass production in the Design Bureau P.O. Sukhoi, work was underway to modify the aircraft. A number of aircraft projects with improved flight and tactical characteristics were developed, which included improving its aerodynamics, equipping it with new engines (M-63TK, M-81, M-89, M-90), etc.

Su-2 began to enter service with the Air Force units of the spacecraft in the second half of 1940. By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War as of June 22, 1941, the fleet of Su-2 aircraft in the Air Force consisted of 213 copies (Western Front - 75; South-Western Front - 114; 9th Separate Army (Odessa Military District) - 24). Until 1944, according to various sources, from 14 to 17 short-range bomber aviation regiments, more than 12 reconnaissance and correction squadrons and 18 units armed with Su-2 aircraft took part in combat operations.

At different times, during the Great Patriotic War, 27 pilots who were awarded the title of Heroes of the Soviet Union fought on Su-2 aircraft, of which M.P. Odintsov and G.F. Sivkov was awarded this title twice.

The Su-2 aircraft, or, as it is also called, BB-1, is a light bomber that was widely used during the Second World War. This machine had significant differences from machines of a similar design at that time. The Su-2 aircraft has a greater view from the pilot's seat, which allows him to use the machine more efficiently and skillfully. Due to the review, this unit was often used as a spotter for our artillery. An innovation was the idea of ​​​​the chief designer P. Sukhoi to move all the bombs into the middle of the hull, which would increase the speed of the machine. During development, the designers planned to make the car completely out of metal. Unfortunately, this could not be done, since the metal was scarce.

The history of the creation of the Su-2 bomber

The development of a new high-speed attack aircraft, which was supposed to fly over long distances, began in the winter of 1936. This car was called "Ivanov" in the documents. In 1937, P.O. Dry, who made his own adjustments. The main changes affected the power plant, since the designer equipped this unit with a more reliable air-cooled engine of the M-62 type.

As for the time that was spent on design and manufacture, it was very short. The first prototype was ready six months after the start of the project development. For the first time, the prototype of the Su-2 aircraft was flown in the summer of 1937. Quite a lot of time was spent on finalizing the engine, which constantly broke down. It was because of this engine that the car was not allowed to go to state tests.

After modifications, the aircraft was tested in 1938 and entered the plant to replace the engine. But new engine the same type on the third flight failed, and the machine crashed. After this incident, Su-2 aircraft began to be equipped with new, more reliable engines of the M-87 type. The new power plant made it possible to achieve high flight performance and pass state tests in 1939. The military were interested in this machine and decided on its mass production in Kharkov, and Pavel Sukhoi was appointed chief designer.

The first machines had both iron and wooden parts in their construction, since there was a catastrophic lack of metal. The latest cars were equipped with more advanced engines. The production of these aircraft went on at a very large scale, since more than 910 units of this aircraft were produced from 1940 to 42.

In addition, throughout the entire production period, the designers have constantly worked on the improvement and modernization of this machine. During the Second World War, the Su-2 aircraft was widely used in military operations and proved to be a high-quality combat vehicle. 27 pilots who flew this device were awarded the highest award - the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Design features of the Su-2 aircraft

The aircraft was made according to the scheme of a cantilever glider with one engine. The body is made of metal and plywood, which made it possible to save metal and lighten the overall weight of the structure. The cockpit was covered with a fairing, which is equipped with a lantern. The fairing is made of plexiglass, it provides excellent visibility to the pilots. The aircraft is controlled by two pilots, who are located in two cabins with heating.

The wings are made of duralumin. Each wing is equipped with fuel tanks that can be serviced using hatches in the wing. The keel of the aircraft is made of duralumin, as is the steering wing. The control of the machine is paired, it allows each pilot to control the machine. The chassis in the Su-2 was retracted into internal niches due to the electric drive. The landing gear of this aircraft consists of three pillars.

The power plant of the machine is represented by a 14-cylinder engine of the M-88 model, which is cooled by air. Engine power is 950 horsepower. The engine drives a three-bladed propeller, which has a diameter of 3.35 meters.

As for the hood that covers the engine, it consists of two parts and is equipped with a skirt. The right side of the hood has a hole for the exhaust pipe. On top of the hood is a panel with which you can get to the fuel tank located in the fuselage of the car.

As for armament, the aircraft has three 7.62 mm machine guns, one of them is controlled by the co-pilot. Some modifications of the Su-2 machine had a hatch in the bottom, which was located in the navigator's cabin. With it, it was possible to protect the bottom of the device. As for the bombs carried by the aircraft, they were located in the bomb bay and on external bomb racks. The means of communication for the pilots was a radio station of the Dvina type, which was located in the co-pilot's cockpit.

Su-2 characteristics:

Light reconnaissance bomber Su-2 ("Ivanov", ANT-51, BB-1).

Developer: Sukhoi Design Bureau
Country: USSR
First flight: 1939

The construction of the third "Ivanov" OKB P. O. Sukhoi (by order No. 452) ended in September 1938. By design, the car was similar to the previous two prototypes, but the M-62 engine was replaced with a more powerful and high-altitude M-87. The capacity of the gas tanks was reduced from 930 to 700 liters, and the ammunition load of the wing machine guns was increased to 850 rounds for each. According to the pilot A.P. Chernavsky, who made the first flight on November 3, new car the takeoff was reduced and the glide slope became steeper. Before the delivery of the SZ-3 (Stalin's task) for state tests, the military demanded that the M-87 be replaced with a more reliable M-87A, but the latter also failed after three flights on November 25.

For state tests at the Air Force Research Institute, the Ivanov aircraft came from cover letter, which said that he “... is an extremely valuable object for the Red Army Air Force, must complete flight tests as soon as possible. The performed flights of the finishing and verification procedure show that the aircraft, both in terms of reliability and in terms of the controllability of the controls, can fly according to the normal program ... "

From February 3 to April 6, 1939, in Yevpatoriya, a team of military engineer 3rd rank A.V. Sinelnikov, pilot Major B.N. Pokrovsky and navigator Major A.M. Tretyakov tested the car. 78 sorties were carried out by military specialists, after which Major P.M. Stefanovsky flew over. An experienced test pilot narrowly avoided a serious accident when the right landing gear did not fully extend on landing. Having successfully landed on one wheel, Petr Mikhailovich still could not keep the car on the run, with breakdowns of the landing gear units, damage to the center section lining and pipes, it had to be sent for repair.

But the flight accident did not spoil the impression of the new "Ivanov". In his review, B.N. Pokrovsky emphasized that the aircraft “... represents an example of a well-thought-out cultural machine with high speeds, good rate of climb, good overview, sensitivity to management. Flights on this aircraft leave a pleasant impression of the car ... " The aircraft was also positively evaluated by other participants in the work. It is not surprising that in the conclusion of the state test report, the head of the Air Force Research Institute A.I. Filin recommended that the car be adopted by our aviation as a light bomber, with the possibility of using it as an attack aircraft and a short-range reconnaissance aircraft. Filin asked the People's Commissariat of the Aviation Industry to build a military series of ten Ivanovs by November 1, 1939, which would differ from the experimental one in a mixed design (wooden fuselage and metal wings).

Events developed rapidly. Even before the end of the state tests, K.E. Voroshilov and M.M. Kaganovich reported on the successes of Sukhoi to Stalin. At the end of March 1939, the Defense Committee decided to launch an aircraft called BB-1 (short-range bomber) into a series at factories No. 135 in Kharkov and Sarcombine (this enterprise did not have a number at that time, and later became factory No. 292) in Saratov. The deadlines were set very strict - Pavel Osipovich was given no more than 20 days to process the drawings for a mixed design and transfer them to the factories. It was planned that the aircraft would be mass-produced either with the M-88 engine (which they were going to later replace the capricious M-87), or with the M-63 TK (with a turbocharger). In both cases, the maximum speed approached the 500 km / h mark desired by the leadership of the aviation industry.

But the decisions adopted then were not destined to be implemented for a long time. Firstly, the engines caused a lot of trouble to the plane. Numerous breakdowns of various engines (M-87, M-87A and M-87B) in 1938-1939 on the Ivanov and other machines only accidentally did not lead to serious flight accidents, but caused long downtime. Shortly before the events described here, "for the wrecking delay in the introduction of the M-87 engines," the director of plant No. P.I. Baranova S.A. Aleksandrov and some other prominent specialists. The same fate befell the chief designer of the plant A.S. Nazarov. All of them completed an internship in France at the factories of the Gnome-Rhone company, managed to gain considerable experience, and their loss turned out to be very noticeable for the cause.

Secondly, although Sukhoi immediately ordered to send a group of designers led by D.A. Romeiko-Gurko to Kharkov, and to Saratov with N.P. Polenov, the aircraft factories were not ready to introduce a new aircraft into the series. At factory No. 135 (head office), work on the drawings of the BB-1 (the machine received the factory designation of the product “H”) began in June 1939. It quickly became clear that the technological profile of the enterprise would have to be radically changed, since the design and technology of the short-range bomber had nothing in common with the R-10 previously produced here.

To manage the process of introducing the aircraft into the series at the head plant, by decision of the Defense Committee of July 29 and the order of M.M. Kaganovich of August 7, 1939, P.O. Sukhoi was appointed chief designer of plant No. formed in the process of working on "Ivanov" team. In the experimental workshop, it was planned to carry out work on the modification and further improvement of the BB-1. Sukhoi was ordered to work out the installation of the M-63TK engine, design and build an armored attack bomber (SB), in the development of the BB-1. The design team at that time consisted of only 63 people. A great contribution to the deployment of mass production of the BB-1 was made by the closest assistants to the Chief: his deputy D.A. Romeiko-Gurko, the head of the general views brigade N.A. propulsion systems E.S. Felsner and others.

At the new location, the Sukhoi team faced numerous difficulties. The director of the Kharkov Aviation Plant, V.Neishtadt, did not take any measures to create an experimental base for the design bureau for a very long time, and the city executive committee did not provide employees with a single apartment - the moved engineers and technicians lived in a hotel apart from their families. Naturally, under these conditions, Muscovites were in no hurry to leave the capital. They also knew that the “Kharkov pioneers” were forced, in the absence of transport, to walk many kilometers on foot every day in rain and frost to work and back. Pavel Osipovich was afraid of the collapse of the design team - some experts told him they were leaving, not wanting to go to Kharkov - and on February 11, 1940, he turned to A.S. Yakovlev, who had just been appointed deputy people's commissar for experimental aircraft construction, with a request "... to provide the team with one of the Moscow production bases, in which, in addition to two or three experimental facilities, it would be possible to arrange the production of small series of 10-15 aircraft per year."

A.S. Yakovlev agreed with this proposal and signed the corresponding order on March 16, 1940. On the basis of KB-29 in Podlipki (previously it was engaged in the development of pressurized cabins and artillery weapons for aircraft), a pilot plant was organized, which received the number 289, and in May the Sukhoi Design Bureau completely moved to a new “apartment”. Pavel Osipovich, who became the chief designer of the experimental plant, had to equip the enterprise with the necessary equipment in the shortest possible time, and create the backbone of the team. The first task was the construction by October 1940 of two modified BB-1s with powerful M-90 engines. At the plant number 135, they received the designation "MN" as backup aircraft "N". Sukhoi's successor in the position of chief designer of the Kharkov plant was P.D. Grushin.

Meanwhile, work continued to improve and fine-tune the experimental SZ-3. Back in early 1938, Sukhoi sent E.S. Felsner to the new chief designer of the engine plant, S.K. Tumansky, to finalize the VMG. Long attempts to improve the output and especially the performance of the M-87 engine did not lead to a positive result. Of particular concern were serious defects in the supercharger and the underdevelopment of the carburetor with an automatic high-altitude corrector.

In April 1939, the Ivanov aircraft with the M-87B was tested at the Air Force Research Institute to test the stability, maneuverability, range and reliability of the engine. Flights, in particular, showed that at an altitude of 1500 m, the bomber performed a turn in 25-26 s, and a combat turn in 17-18 s. With good static and dynamic stability, the car needed to increase lateral stability. The main flight performance data of the BB-1 M-87B remained the same as that of the aircraft with the M-87A engine.

As soon as Sukhoi became aware of the successful modernization of the Tumansky motor, in which the single-speed supercharger was replaced by a two-speed one, he decided immediately - even before the state tests were carried out - to put the new M-88 on the SZ-3. The power of the power plant increased from 950 hp. at an altitude of 4700 m up to 1000 hp at 6000 m, and this promised a noticeable increase in maximum speed. Since when testing the SZ-3 M-87A, a requirement was expressed to provide the navigator with the opportunity to more freely leave the aircraft in emergency situations, the lower installation of the MV-2 was removed, leaving a wide hatch. The installation of a new motor on the BB-1 was completed on November 27, 1939, and after a short factory debugging, the car was handed over for state tests in January 1940. They were conducted by military engineer 3rd rank A.V. Sinelnikov, pilot major B.N. Pokrovsky and navigator captain S.Z. Akopyan.

This time the pilot turned out to be more restrained in evaluating the machine - its flight characteristics did not improve. The test report concluded:

“The BB-1 aircraft with the M-88 engine, which is necessary for arming the Red Army Air Force, due to the lack of knowledge of the propeller group, cannot be allowed for normal operation in combat units ... Slow work on the introduction of the aircraft ... can lead to obsolescence of the aircraft in the process of its production and refinement ". The act required an urgent improvement of the engine in terms of operational reliability.

At the end of the 1930s, the Soviet aircraft industry was going through a serious crisis. In January 1940, A.I. Shakhurin replaced M.M. Kaganovich as People's Commissar. Analyzing the current situation, new leader stated that among the four aircraft of new types (I-180, TB-7, BB-22 and BB-1), which were built by the military series, only the last aircraft successfully passed state tests, but its production unfolded unacceptably slowly. Until the end of 1939, our aviation did not receive a single serial BB-1 bomber. One of Shakhurin's first orders, given to them on January 19, required the management of Plant No. 135 to build 110 Sukhoi bombers by July 1940. “... in order to switch from now on to the production of a modernized BB-1(meaning the car with the M-88. - author's note) at a speed of at least 500 km/h.”

The order of the NKAP No. 56 of February 15, 1940 began with the words: “Given the particular importance of replenishing the air fleet with BB-1 aircraft designed by Comrade Sukhoi and in order to maximize the release of the latter ...” The People's Commissar set a schedule according to which the production of the BB-1 was now unfolding at three plants: the head plant No. 135, as well as No. 31 in Taganrog and No. 207 in Dolgoprudny. They had to hand over 110, 20 and 5 cars, respectively, in the first half of this year. All preparatory work on the "Sarcombine" stopped.

In our opinion, the important and timely decisions of the government and the people's commissariat of the aviation industry, emphasizing the "special significance" of the deployment of the BB-1 program, did not correspond to the capabilities of the factories allocated for its production. Recall that in 1939 the four leading Soviet aircraft factories No. 1, 18, 21 and 22 not only provided 78% of the gross output of the aviation industry, but were also recognized leaders in the development of serial technology and equipment. They had the best machines and equipment, well-trained personnel. Back in May 1938, Sukhoi tried to convince Kaganovich that "... the equipment of plant No. 1 will be entirely able to ensure the production of the Ivanov aircraft". It is possible that if the production of BB-1 had been launched there or at one of the other three enterprises listed above, then the fate of the car would have been different.

P.O. Sukhoi had high hopes for two experimental works: the modification of the SZ-1 under the M-63TK engine and the creation of the ShB (attack-bomber). The first "object" was lifted into the air at the end of March 1940 by the factory pilot A.I. Kalyuzhnov. However, he did not have the necessary high-altitude training, so the TsAGI pilot A.P. Chernavsky had to perform four flights up to an altitude of 6000 m with the inclusion of a turbocharger. During the tests, cracks appeared in the TC branch pipes, and the oil overheated due to insufficient height of the oil pump. The management decided to further develop the capricious M-63TK on the I-153 fighter, and the modified SZ-1 was transferred to the LII. The car was not included in the plan of experimental work for 1941, and with the outbreak of war they forgot about it.

It was originally planned that ShB (otherwise called BB-2) would be a significant step in the development of the Ivanov aircraft, taking into account the accumulated experience. The project provided for the installation of not only the M-88 engine, but also one of the experimental engines of the new M-80 series (later the M-81 engine was released, and the M-82 was in mass construction). The aircraft was built according to the performance requirements approved by the layout commission for the BB-1 in March 1939, so the SB turned out to be very similar to the "big brother" BB-1, differing in an all-wood fuselage, increased armor, and improved aerodynamics. The landing gear retracted back into the center section and closed with struts, while the wheels turned 90 °.

Subsequently, Sukhoi repeatedly successfully applied this landing gear retraction scheme on various types of aircraft. However, trouble happened on the SB: in one of the first flights on June 4, 1940, due to an error in the calculation of the acting forces during the release of the landing gear, a jam occurred in the shock strut bushing. In the next sortie, pilot V.T.Sakhranov could not cope with the aircraft - another accident on July 16 seriously delayed the tests of the SB. Breakdowns continued to haunt the car, and in the late autumn of 1940, Sukhoi was instructed by Shakhurin to use the SB to work out the temperature regimes of the M-88. After the appearance of the "real" Il-2 and Su-6 attack aircraft, the car was considered unpromising. All work on the SB was stopped at the end of April 1941.

Even earlier, work on the BB-1 project for the navy was interrupted. This topic was approved in August 1939 by the People's Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsov and provided for the installation of a land reconnaissance aircraft on two floats. The authors have no information about further activities on this project, as well as about Sukhoi’s work on a “clean” attack aircraft with an M-80 engine. It is only known that the chief designer instructed the OKB employees to start preparing draft design.

The combat and operational qualities of serial BB-1 aircraft were to be tested in the process of military trials. At the end of March 1940, a group of pilots and technicians from the 19th Air Brigade based in the Kharkov Military District arrived at the Kharkov Aviation Plant. Seconded aviators, led by Captain A.I. Pushkin, got acquainted with the new machine right in the shops. According to their suggestions, some design improvements were also carried out here, in particular, the side windows of the BB-1 cabin were restored.

In May, the first 16 modified vehicles were accepted by the military and preparations for testing began. They decided to conduct them in the newly created regiment, which received No. 135 according to the number of the Kharkov plant. The aviators of the regiment, led by Major Nevolin, had to determine some important characteristics of the BB-1 M-88, since many breakdowns occurred during the state tests of the prototype, and they remained, in fact, incomplete. In particular, it was required to confirm the practical ceiling of the aircraft, evaluate fuel consumption in different modes, check the possibility of flying in adverse weather conditions and at night. It was also necessary to determine the possibility of using FAB-250 bombs from underwing holders. Hard work lasted from May 10 to June 20. It was headed by the Air Force Research Institute - military engineer of the 2nd rank S.N. Chasovikov, pilots captain S.M. Korobov and Art. Lieutenant Yu.N.

Military trials were satisfactory, although not without incident. So, when flying to a distance along the route: Kharkov - Belgorod - Izyum - Kharkov, at a high altitude, the control units on the plane froze and a catastrophe almost occurred. In addition, high-altitude flights revealed poor-quality painting of the aircraft - the paint peeled off and fell off the leading edge of the wing and stabilizer. Among the main defects of the bomber were the unreliability of the engine, the oiling of the sight and the lower hatch of the navigator, the insufficient strength of the landing gear and pneumatics. The load on the rudders increased unevenly and turned out to be excessively large (compared to the experimental aircraft), backlash and friction appeared in the suspension units of the elevators and ailerons.

At the same time, the report noted that the aircraft is easy to operate, the approach to various individual units is convenient, repair and replacement of parts do not present difficulties. The car took off freely from a dirt strip with a load of 700 kg of bombs. “Pilots with below average qualifications, who came to the part from the Air Force flight schools, master the aircraft easily and after 20-25 export flights they were independently released on the BB-1”, - stated in the report on military tests. The pilots were pleased with the good forward visibility from the cockpit and the comfortable high control stick. The head of the Main Directorate of the Air Force, P.V. Rychagov, and the inspector for piloting technique of one of the military districts, A.V. Belyakov, who arrived at the regiment, after a short ground inspection, safely made a familiarization flight on the BB-1.

Despite the favorable test results, on July 18, in a report addressed to Stalin and Voroshilov, Rychagov expressed the opinion that in 1941 it was necessary to demand from P.O. slats and increase the transverse V of the wing. After the joint meeting of pilots, navigators and designers held in Moscow, where Major L.M. Maksimov made a report on the BB-1, and experienced Air Force inspectors Colonels I.I. Dushkin, I.P. Selivanov and I.A. .Titov, division commander P.A. Alekseev proposed to suspend the production of the Sukhoi aircraft until the main shortcomings were completely eliminated.

The people's commissar for the aviation industry A.I. Shakhurin did not agree with this. In his opinion, such a decision could cause production downtime. The flights of the 135th BAP aviators showed that the aircraft was simple and safe to operate. In addition, the motors began to work much more reliably, allowing the car to continuously climb 7000 m (Previously, the pilots had to cool the engine on horizontal platforms two or three times when climbing at the highest rate of climb due to overheating of the oil.) The situation with the BB-1 looked noticeably better in comparison with other new types of machines, for example, with A.S. Yakovlev’s BB-22. Therefore, Shakhurin considered it expedient to take the Sukhoi bomber into service, fully equip the 135th BAP with vehicles and finally bring the vehicle directly to this unit in the second half of 1940.

Sukhoi did not make any fundamental changes to the serial design of the BB-1 at that time. Factories built aircraft, trying to work out the technology and eliminate the shortcomings of production. The greatest success in mastering the BB-1 was achieved in Kharkov. There, by the summer of 1940, they introduced the plasma-template method, mastered the high-speed method for making stamps, and began to use the latest milling machines type "Nord-American" and hydraulic presses for 500 tons. During the first five months of 1940, three more new workshops were built, for 20% of the load: the number of workers increased and the labor intensity of one machine decreased by 40%. Director Yu.N. Karpov and chief engineer I.M. Kuzin explained to the leadership of the aviation industry the failure to fulfill the plan by interruptions in the supply of components and, above all, engines. So, engine plant No. 29 sent 132 M-87 and M-88 engines during this period instead of 185 planned, of which only 116 turned out to be serviceable.

In the history of the Taganrog plant number 31 named after. Dimitrov, who specialized in the creation of aircraft for the Navy, 1940 remained as one of the most difficult. At the same time, machines that had little in common in design were under construction: MBR-2, KOR-1, GST, MDR-6 and BB-1. In addition, the Taganrog residents made parts and spare parts for the MBR-2, SSS and P-Z reconnaissance aircraft. Preparations for mass production of the R-5 began, but then this decision was canceled. “The plant drowned in a variety of technologically different types of machines, lost its production rhythm, actually stopped working in series, and thus found itself on the sidelines of supplying the army with modern combat aircraft”, - wrote the director I.G. Zagainov in the report. When deploying the production of BB-1, the “thirty-first” lacked, first of all, milling and planing machines, and the aid promised by the People's Commissariat in equipment and personnel was not received.

Plant No. 207 was known in the late 30s as "Airshipstroy". For some time it seemed that airships had a great future in military aviation, but then the views changed. Simultaneously with the decision on the serial construction of the BB-1, the government ordered to mothball the work on the huge airships of the B-1 series and the gondola for the DP-9. In addition, the plant ceased production of spare parts for the I-15bis. However, low qualification of personnel, poor organization of production, disproportion between machine assembly and assembly shops, a large lack of milling machines hindered the development of BB-1, led to a large percentage of defects. Only after the reconstruction of the plant and the establishment of cooperation with other enterprises, it was possible to lay two series of five machines. Until December 1940, Plant No. 207, like No. 31, did not build a single BB-1.

The 135th BAP played a special role in fine-tuning the machine. After the end of military trials, the unit became a real training ground. From October 1940, when the regiment was headed by Colonel B.V. Jansen, until May 1941, instructors were being trained in it. 67 pilots and 71 navigators (they were also called observer pilots) mastered all the features of the new machine and managed to retrain the leadership of nine other units before the war.

In the Jansen regiment, attention was also paid to the tactical training of aviators. Training bombing showed that due to the imperfection of the sights maximum height the drop of bombs should not exceed 3000 m, and the working one - 1000-1200 m. Near the ground, attacks by enemy fighters from below seemed unlikely, as a result of which hatch installations were not installed on the aircraft. The military representatives did not oppose this, given the opinion of P.O. Sukhoi that the hatch installation and the navigator’s reservation would increase the weight of the vehicle and shift the centering back. Moreover, when in September 1940 the Defense Committee considered the issue of strengthening the machine gun and cannon armament of production aircraft, the BB-1 turned out to be the only machine that was “disarmed”: instead of four wing machine guns, two were left and the hatch ShKAS was eliminated. The war showed the fallacy of these measures.

In the autumn of 1940, Sukhoi's attention was attracted by the new M-81 engine, developed under the leadership of A.D. Shvetsov. The decision of the Council of People's Commissars of October 23 stated that its fine-tuning is “the most important and priority task of plant No. 19. The director of the engine plant G.V. Kozhevnikov was instructed to urgently send three experimental M-81 engines with an extended shaft to Kharkov for installation on a serial BB -1. By this time, Pavel Osipovich managed to re-equip the second prototype of the MN machine "Understudy", replacing the M-90 with the M-81. Despite the forced landing of the "Understudy" in the second test flight due to engine jamming, Sukhoi believed in the prospects of work. However, at the end of November 1940, the leadership of the NKAP considered the M-81 engine to be a "dead end direction of development", its implementation and refinement was stopped.

At this time, the attitude of the leadership towards the Sukhoi car changed greatly in a negative direction. The opinion began to be expressed that the BB-1 as a type would not find wide application in a future war. The military was well aware of the defenselessness of the Polish Karas light single-engine bombers against German fighter attacks. Later it became known that the British "Battles" (closest to the BB-1 in terms of design and purpose), which were considered quite modern on the eve of the war, suffered exceptionally heavy losses in the May 1940 battles in France. Soviet intelligence reported that the largest Austin factories in Coventry switched to the production of four-engine bombers, stopping the construction of the Battles.

Experts understood that the success of the Ju-87 dive bomber could not be attributed only to German propaganda. However, they bought in Germany and studied in detail at the Air Force Research Institute not it, but another, twin-engine dive bomber Ju-88, which had a great influence on the Soviet aviation industry and even on military doctrine. The country's leadership was not convinced that in the upcoming war it would be possible to immediately gain air supremacy, and without it, a single-engine two-seat bomber was very vulnerable. According to the leadership of the Main Directorate of the Air Force and the NKAP, our country needed in mass production not a single-engine "horizontal" bomber, but a twin-engine dive bomber. As a result, the BB-1 aircraft was actually no longer considered as a new type of serial bomber. And earlier, the country's leadership did not favor Sukhoi and his creation with their attention. We can cite the following fact: before the war, his cars did not participate in any parade or major display of new aircraft. Now, after Pavel Osipovich's refusal to convert the aircraft into a dive bomber, interest in the BB-1 seemed to have completely disappeared.

In addition, in the fall of 1940, the aircraft industry failed to overcome the crisis in improving engines, especially those developed in the Design Bureau of S.K. Tumansky. On M-88 engines, burnouts of pistons, shaking of the VMG, increased oil consumption, which led to smoking, were constantly noted. If at the first speed of the supercharger an excessive depletion of the mixture was observed, then at the second - over-enrichment. I had to temporarily suspend their serial production. It was difficult to fine-tune the promising M-90 engine, on which the NKAP had high hopes. As a result, E.V. Urmin replaced Tumansky as the chief designer of plant No. 29. The director S.A. Gromov was almost arrested - only Shakhurin's intercession saved him from an early reprisal.

On December 9, 1940, at a joint meeting of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, a program for the production of aircraft and engines for 1941 was considered. In this extremely important document, the aircraft industry was ordered to stop building obsolete aircraft. For the short-range bomber BB-1, renamed after the chief designer in Su-2, an annual plan was established for all three factories in 1150 vehicles (out of a total of 6070 bombers). 600 Su-2s were to be built in 1941 in Kharkov.

Some change for the better in the production of Sukhoi bombers was outlined in early December, despite the fact that plant No. 31 was reoriented again by the end of the year - this time to the production of LaGG-3 fighters. Work in progress, part of the equipment and 70 almost finished Su-2s were transferred from Taganrog to Dolgoprudny. The leadership of the NKAP had every reason to expect that plant No. 207 would soon be able to contribute to the supply of aircraft for the Air Force.

After receiving satisfactory test results for the M-88 engine, its serial construction was resumed under the designation M-88B. In Kharkov, shortly before the new 1941, these engines were installed not only on the newly built Su-2, but also replaced substandard engines on already produced machines. In the last days of December 1940, not only was it possible for the first time to fulfill the plan and hand over 40 aircraft to military representatives, but also to provide a reserve for the implementation of the next year's program.

It is appropriate to say a few words about the numbers of serial bombers. Several Taganrog cars had the type (code) "26" and a six-digit number, including the factory number. So, one of the aircraft of the 211th bap had number 263107. In Kharkov, the numbering of the Su-2 continued in the order adopted for the R-10. For example, cars No. 9/2 and 1/4 were transferred in January 1941 to the 135th BAP. Since the spring of this year, the bomber's five-digit factory number has become standard. For example, aircraft No. 19017, 54093, 17106 were in the summer of 1942 in the 209th BAP, and the Su-2 No. 05056 was flown in the autumn of 1941 by the crew of ml. Lieutenant I.A. Klevtsov and Art. Lieutenant M.A. Lashin from the 135th BAP.

And finally, as if specifically to confuse enemy spies, serial numbers were assigned in Dolgoprudny. It is known that the machines of plant number 207 usually had five numbers and one letter, moving from series to series. The numbers "07" determined the type of machine, the letters indicated the encrypted series number, and the remaining numbers - the serial number of each aircraft in the series.

The establishment of serial production made it possible to calculate the cost of the aircraft. She turned out to be quite tall. So, Kharkiv "dryers" cost the country 430 thousand rubles, and Dolgoprudny ones were even more expensive - 700 thousand. For comparison, we note that the SB of plant No. 22 cost only 265 thousand rubles, and BB-22 of plant No. 1 - 400 thousand rubles . The main reasons for the high costs can be explained by the low mechanization of production even at plant No. 135 (compared to our advanced enterprises), significant amounts of machining of a large number of parts and high metal consumption (845 kg of duralumin and 440 kg of steel for each aircraft).

The widespread introduction of the Su-2 into combat units began in January 1941. Following the 135th BAP, vehicles from Kharkov entered the 211th and 227th BAPs. Meanwhile, the Dolgoprudny plant "took patronage" over the 97th BAP, and from Taganrog all the vehicles accepted by the military representatives were transferred to the 211th BAP. By the end of March, the leadership and technical staff of four more air regiments, the 103rd, 209th, 210th and 226th, got acquainted with the Su-2. Until the spring of 1941, serial aircraft entered western counties in very limited quantities, which forced the command of the Red Army Air Force to extend the retraining period. So, for the 211th BAP, Major F.G. Rodyakin, a plan for the development of the Su-2 was approved, stretched for nine (!) Months (from January to September 1941). Naturally, the outbreak of the war squeezed all the deadlines.

Military tests of the Su-2, which took place in the spring in the 135th BAP, revealed 28 serious defects in the vehicle. The military demanded to insulate the spinnerets of the propellers for operation at high altitudes, to eliminate distortions in the moving part of the canopy, and also to eliminate the leakage of the mixture in the chassis shock absorbers and gasoline from the drainage line during a dive. The chief designer was offered to develop a system for filling gas tanks with neutral gases as soon as possible as fuel was used up and to cut a hatch in the engine hood to ensure engine heating from the APL-1 blowtorch.

Serious problems were caused by the unreliable operation of the propeller group. On most machines, shaking of the M-88 and M-88B engines was observed. If at the first speed of the supercharger it was accompanied by intermittent exhausts, then at the second speed it was accompanied by a violation of uniform operation. There were cases of cutoff motors in the air. Special tests that took place in the 135th BAP in March 1941 with the participation of P.O. Sukhoi showed that the shaking of the motors disappeared with the appropriate adjustment of the carburetor auto-corrector needle. It suddenly turned out that these parts are not interchangeable on the M-88 and M-88B engines.

Castor oil thrown out of the engine breather splashed the lower transparent part of the navigator's cabin and the OPB-1m sight, preventing the bomber from aiming at the target. In addition, the navigator's chair turned out to be very uncomfortable, preventing a quick transition from bombing to observing the air in the upper hemisphere and firing from a defensive machine gun. In the meantime, one of the aircraft was equipped with an NV-5 sight for operations from low altitudes, the second with KD-2 underwing cassettes, and the third with a PCR-1 radio station, but this equipment and weapons were not used in the series. An unsuccessful decision was an attempt to replace the plexiglass of the cockpit canopy with celluloid, as transparency was quickly lost and the crew's visibility deteriorated.

The wheels of the first production vehicles had insufficiently strong flanges, which collapsed after 15-20 landings. By the beginning of January 1941, 27 Su-2s could not take to the skies in the 135th BAP due to broken wheels. There was also a lack of spare tires. Operational tests of the reinforced landing gear wheels showed that they began to correspond to the flight weight of the aircraft. By the beginning of April, the factory team had replaced several sets of chassis shock struts, which had withstood three hundred landings.

The flight crew liked the warm, closed cockpit the most in the plane. “In winter, at least fly in a T-shirt, not like on the R-5, where the frost penetrates to the bones!” Junior Lieutenant N.Ya.Tuzov (who later became a general) from the 2nd separate aerial photography squadron belonging to the 7th (cartographic) Main Directorate of the General Staff, made 25 sorties on the Su-2 during the war years. He recalled with regret that there were no Sukhoi machines in the winter of 1941, when their unit on P-5 and P-Z aircraft conducted intensive surveys in Belarus.

“... Pilot classes are going on. The teacher dictates a lot of numbers: wing span, SAH, aileron and trim angles. And then it went: compression ratio, valve clearances, piston stroke, cylinder operation order ... The pilots diligently wrote all this down in their notebooks ”, - this is how the beginning of the study of the Su-2 in the spring of 1941 was remembered by the young pilot of the 227th BAP, foreman K.F. Belokon, later Hero of the Soviet Union. Both in it and in neighboring parts, the development of the machine proceeded at a slow pace, with an emphasis on theoretical studies. Due to the poor condition of the airfields and interruptions in the supply of fuel, there were practically no flights in the spring.

However, work at the Air Force Research Institute did not stop either in winter or in spring. From December 1940 to March 1941, test pilot A.K. Dolgov conducted state tests of three Su-2s. One of the received cars (No. 1/6) differed significantly from the serial ones (Nos. 16/2 and 20/2). The purpose of the modification was to increase the tactical flight data to the requirements of 1941. To do this, the oil cooler was moved to the center section, the hood profile and the shape of the suction pipe were changed. The rather bulky rear turret of the MB-5 was replaced by a TSS-1 turret with a sliding cover. In general, the results of the work carried out were encouraging. The speed compared to production aircraft increased by 33-38 km / h, and the practical ceiling - by 700 m. For the first time, at the second altitude limit, the Su-2 flew faster than 500 km / h.

Leading engineer A.V. Sinelnikov expressed concern - for the umpteenth time - about the unreliability of the engines. While it worked satisfactorily on the modified aircraft, four M-88Bs had to be replaced on serial machines, and three of them failed after three hours of operation due to scuffing and burnout of the pistons. Navigator Captain Gladintsev noted a number of advantages of the TSS-1, but did not ignore the disadvantages: small angles of fire, difficulties in conducting aimed fire when working in an air stream, the difficulty of transferring a machine gun from traveling to combat position.

According to the head of the Air Force Research Institute A.I. Filin, the changes made on the modified machine should have been introduced into the series after the defects noted during the tests were eliminated. But here the production workers showed haste and already in the spring they began to build the Su-2 with the TSS-1 turret. Meanwhile, the turret was modified and improved, but its state tests ended with unsatisfactory results. General I.F. Petrov, who replaced Filin at the Air Force Research Institute, considered the defense capability of the Su-2 to be unacceptably weakened, and after his intervention at the end of May 1941, the MB-5 turret was restored. In total, the factories produced 250 vehicles with the TSS-1 turret.

Shortly before the start of the war, Sukhoi determined his attitude towards new engines. He believed that already in the autumn of 1941, the serial production of the Su-2 could be transferred to the M-89 engine, which was created under the leadership of S.K. Tumansky and then E.V. Urmin. But, according to Pavel Osipovich, the A.D. Shvetsov M-82 engine promised much more advantages in flight characteristics - a further development of the M-81. The M-90 and AM-37 were considered as promising engines - for them, the chief designer from February 1941 began to design and build experimental Su-4 (BB-3) machines. Unlike the Su-2, they had to have not only a wooden fuselage, but also a wooden wing with metal spars. It was planned that the Taubin heavy machine guns would replace the ShKAS in the wings and on the upper turret.

The plan for the first half of the year 1941 for the production of Su-2 industry was fulfilled by 119% (on average for bombers - by 86%), On June 1, factories reported 413 Su-2s accepted by military representatives. Of this number, the location of 388 vehicles is known (382 had M-88 and 88B engines, and the rest - M-87). In the border military districts (VO), Su-2s were distributed as follows: in the Western Special Military District - 64, in the Kiev Special Military District - 91 and in the Odessa Military District - 22. There were 124 bombers in the Kharkov Military District, 85 - at factory airfields and 7 - in training center. Several aircraft had to be written off as a result of flight accidents, while others had not yet arrived at their destination.

Shortly before the enemy invasion, many aircraft managed to prepare for operations in difficult weather conditions and at high altitudes. In Kharkov, Bobruisk, Kyiv and Vitebsk, by the beginning of June, the installation of RPK-2 radio semi-compasses on 99 serial Su-2s was completed. At the same time, it was possible to eliminate the main defects of the oxygen equipment. This work unfolded after an appeal to P.F. Zhigarev on May 5 by the commander of the Air Force of the Kharkov Military District, General S.K. Goryunov, who noted the facts of malfunction of KPA-3 devices and unsuccessful installation of oxygen cylinders on dozens of Sukhoi bombers.

On June 16, flights began at the Air Force Research Institute of the serial Su-2, built at factory No. front hemisphere. Nevertheless, the head of the department of the institute, a military engineer of the 1st rank, P.V. Rudintsev, recommended that the MV-5m be put into production. The tests were successfully completed in a few days. The most important findings were:
- The serial Su-2 M-88B aircraft manufactured by factory No. 207 does not differ in quality from the serial aircraft of factory No. 135.
- Most of the defects that were previously noted during state tests of serial Su-2 produced by plant No. 135 were eliminated on the aircraft.
- The flight properties and characteristics of the aircraft produced by factory No. 207 are almost the same as those of the aircraft of factory No. 135.
- The propeller group on the plane worked normally.
-Temperature modes oils during flight at the rated power of the engine in level flight and during climb up to 8000 m are normal and did not exceed 60 ° C at the inlet and 108 ° C at the outlet ...

The test results were encouraging and they were brought to the attention of the Sukhoi Design Bureau, as well as the commanders and headquarters of the active units. The last peaceful days in the regiments passed in different ways. In an atmosphere of the strictest secrecy, they mastered the Su-2 in Kotovsk, where the 211th BAP was stationed. Even the aviators of the 20th Air Division, which included the regiment, did not know anything about the new car. In the course of intensive training work of the 227th BAP at the Borodyanka airfield, five accidents occurred in June. And the pilots of the 43rd BAP failed to complete a single flight after June 7 due to lack of fuel.

By the beginning of the war, out of 82 short-range bomber regiments of the Red Army Air Force, eight had mastered the Su-2 to one degree or another, and two more did not have time to receive vehicles from the factories, but planned to begin the retraining process soon. The 195 Sukhoi bombers (132 in service) located near the border were located south of the 55th parallel, approximately from the Vilnius-Vitebsk line to the Black Sea. In other types of aviation (Air Force of the Navy, air units of the NKVD), Su-2 aircraft were absent.

Important events also took place far from the front line. From the first days of the war, the government took a number of decisions aimed at increasing the production of Su-2. According to one of the first military decrees, from June 29, 1941, Voronezh Plant No. 450 was exempted from previously issued programs and completely switched to work in cooperation with Plant No. 135 - the lead plant for the production of Su-2. Kharkov plants "Sickle and Hammer" and "Gidroprivod" received state orders only for the production, respectively, of fuselages and landing gear for Sukhoi bombers. In early July, in order to improve economic relations, the branch of the Voronezh plant No. 450 was transformed into a branch of the Kharkov aircraft plant.

A very important decision State Committee defense, which was adopted on July 4, required a significant increase in the production of aircraft and engines starting this month. Plant No. 135 was given a task to produce 368 Su-2s in the 3rd quarter of 1941, and Plant No. 207 was given 92 similar vehicles. With the successful fulfillment of planned targets, already in July the Red Army Air Force was to receive 155 Sukhoi bombers. Cadre workers were exempted from conscription into the army. At the same time, the entire management and engineering staff of the factories was transferred to the barracks.

No less attention was paid to improving the combat qualities of aircraft. First of all, an attempt was made to increase the reliability of weapons and the firepower of the Su-2. On production vehicles, already in July, the quality of electric triggers was improved, they again returned to the quartet of wing machine guns and restored the lower MV-2 turret. On August 7, comparative tests of the MV-2 and LU-100 hatch turrets were completed at the Air Force Research Institute. In the design of the latter, it was possible to eliminate a number of inconveniences for the navigator, noted when working with the MV-2. First of all, the LU-100 allowed the navigator to freely leave the aircraft through the lower hatch, and also provided somewhat larger firing angles. However, the military considered it inappropriate to break mass production for the sake of these advantages and did not install LU-100 turrets on serial Su-2.

But the MB-5m turret (modified), which successfully passed field tests on July 23, 1941, replaced the old model of the upper firing point. It allowed the navigator to quickly switch from shooting to bombing and vice versa. Due to the inconvenience of replacing cartridge boxes and reloading the ShKAS machine gun, a continuous tape of increased length was used in the modified installation.

At the end of July, they successfully passed field tests and were introduced into the KMB-Su-2 series of small bomb cassettes, which replaced the KD-1. It was possible to significantly simplify and speed up the preparation of the bomber for takeoff, to make fuller use of the bomb bays. Tests at NIPAV showed that with a normal load of AO-2.5 bombs, the Su-2 could carry about 400 kg of cargo, and with a maximum load of 600 kg. Cassettes on the Su-2 managed to be introduced into the series much earlier than on the Il-2 attack aircraft. The industry quickly eliminated interruptions in the supply of modern electric dumpers (until July 7, obsolete ESBR-2 along with ESBR-6 were installed on cars). The work of airfield personnel was intended to be facilitated by specially designed carts for cassettes.

The very first air battles revealed the insufficiency of the navigator's armor protection. In fact, she didn't exist at all. Without waiting for directives, on July 10, 1941, the chief engineer of plant No. 135 P.G. Chepelev wrote a letter to the people's commissar for the aviation industry A.I. Shakhurin, chief designer P.O. “When working on the Su-2 front, it was discovered that it was necessary to install a navigator’s side armor protection on the aircraft. Plant No. 135 is urgently working on a layout of the navigator's armor protection, and upon receipt of the armor, it will be installed on all aircraft. Due to the additional armor, the weight will increase by 35 kg, due to the hatch installation - by another 30 kg. Based on this, I consider it expedient to reduce weight and shorten the production cycle to remove the RPK-2 radio semi-compass, curtains for blind flights, and a metal navigator's chair from the machine, while retaining the installation for the AFA-13 camera only on every fifth Su-2. In total, a weight reduction of 42 kg can be achieved.”

Chepelev did not know that immediately after the enemy's invasion, Sukhoi instructed his pilot plant to develop an enhanced armor scheme. Already on June 26, the head of the brigade, N.A. Fomin, presented, and the chief designer approved, a variant of armor protection, which differed from that proposed by the serial plant, increasing the armor from below, and not from the side of the aircraft. The military, having considered the proposals, at first offered to "give the green light" to both options, and then preferred the Sukhoi scheme.

In the meantime, from Brovar, where the 211th BAP was based on July 29, a telegram was received from the engineer of the regiment Byazya with a request to urgently send 42 sets of armor protection for installation on the Su-2 in the field. The military engineer believed that it was better to put armor plates in the form of an apron on the movable ring of the turret. According to the headquarters of the regiment, combat losses by this time amounted to 2 pilots and 23 navigators. (According to other sources, during the two months of the war, 4 pilots and 14 navigators died in the 211th BAP, not counting the aviators who did not return from a combat mission.)

By the beginning of August 1941, the Podolsk plant produced 100 sets of armor according to the scheme of the chief designer, and the plant in Mariupol - 10 sets according to the Kharkiv version; factory brigades urgently went to the front to strengthen the protection of already produced aircraft. On August 9, the situation with the reservation of the Su-2 crew was considered by the government. GKO Resolution No. 441, issued on that day, demanded that, from August 15, all aircraft with navigator armor protection in the form of 8.5 mm cemented steel sheets be produced. To maintain alignment and payload, a radio station and a radio semi-compass were removed from the car. By the same decree, the State Defense Committee ordered the People's Commissariat of the shipbuilding industry to immediately ensure the mass production of Su-2 aircraft with armor plates from the Mariupol plant named after. Ilyich.

Among the works carried out by Pilot Plant No. 289, the main place was taken by the development of new aircraft engines. Even before the start of the war, a propeller installation was designed for the M-89 engine. In July, the Su-2 M-89 aircraft was completed at factory No. 135.

The new engine differed in size from the M-88B only in an elongated gearbox shaft, but it had a 150 hp larger one. power, which promised an increase in speed and rate of climb. After several test flights, during which the oil was very overheated, it was possible to achieve normal oil temperatures in all flight modes by installing two standard 9-inch oil coolers in the tips of the center section.

From August 12 to 18, 1941, pilot A.P. Deev conducted factory tests of the new machine. Aircraft No. 13016 differed from the serial Su-2 (in addition to the engine) in an easily removable spinner of the Messerschmitt type without a ratchet and a lower LU installation that was completely retractable in the stowed position into the fuselage. Initially, the machine had a TSS-1 upper turret, but during the testing process it was replaced by the MV-5. According to the pilot's response, in terms of piloting technique, the aircraft did not differ much from the serial ones, and the maximum speed was approximately 50 km / h more at all altitudes. In one of the flights, Deev, coming out of a thundercloud, developed an airspeed of 565 km / h while diving - no vibrations or deformations were noticed in the structure.

Of course, the M-89 engine was still "raw", unfinished. Due to insufficient finning, some cylinder heads often overheated. At the same time, its application promised great prospects. Immediately after the factory tests, Su-2 No. 13016 was transferred to Factory No. 289 for testing and testing the M-89B engine with direct fuel injection on this machine. It was decided to carry out subsequent flights at the LII NKAP, but the evacuation prevented their completion.

At the end of July, under the onslaught of the enemy, the Zaporozhye Engine Plant No. 29 had to be evacuated to Molotov (Perm). In August, serial production of the Su-2 was not rhythmic due to interruptions in the supply of cassettes, emergency electric releases, but most of all, there were not enough motors. On August 25, plant No. 135 had 35 M-88B and 80 M-89 engines. General F.I. Zharov, head of the Main Directorate for Armaments Orders of the Air Force, decided to urgently transfer all M-88B engines to Komsomolsk-on-Amur, since the situation with the release of DB-3F bombers was simply threatening, but allowed the use of the engine hit for the Su-2 program M-89. Indeed, while the “motor crisis” could not be overcome, several dozen modified vehicles were sent to the front, while others were equipped with M-88Bs with crankcases from M-89.

Even greater prospects, according to P.O. Sukhoi, were promised by the installation of the M-82 engine on the Su-2. The plane was built by the beginning of July 1941, and pilot N.D.Fixon began flying at the airfield of factory No. 289. Already the first flights showed insufficient engine throttle response due to sticking of the metering needle, stiff throttles and unsatisfactory operation of the carburetor at idle . Deputy People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry V.P. Kuznetsov, who personally supervised the progress of the tests, ordered the chief designer of plant No. 33 F.A. Korotkov to urgently bring the carburetors, and carry out further work on the Su-2 M-82 at the FRI.

Despite all the efforts of Sukhoi, Shvetsov and Korotkov, the tests of the machine dragged on for a long time. Before the evacuation, three motors, six carburetors, four P-7 regulators had to be changed. Just to select the most suitable carburetor, factory pilots made 80 sorties. Until the end of September, it was not possible to complete the flight tests of the prototype aircraft; at the beginning of October 1941, the Su-2 M-82 was transported to Kazan, where the sketches of the VMG were removed from it for use on the TB-7 bomber.

A story about the experimental work of plant No. 289 would be incomplete if we did not mention the development of drawings for a wooden wing and a winter standard for a serial machine. The Su-2 was also tested as a reconnaissance and artillery spotter. According to the leadership of the Main Directorate of the Air Force, the Pe-2 and Pe-3 were the most suitable aircraft in the first role, but in the second, the Su-2 turned out to be simply irreplaceable. “Having a speed range from 220 to 450 km / h, sufficient weapons, the aircraft allows you to perform artillery tasks,” the report noted. Carried out in August 1941 at the direction of the Deputy Commander of the Air Force, General I.F. Petrov, comparative tests of the Su-2 and the two-seat training Yak-7 showed the indisputable advantage of the dryers.

On the Yak-7, it was impossible to increase the payload due to additional special equipment without a significant deterioration in flight data. The dimensions of the second cockpit of the Yakovlevsky aircraft turned out to be insufficient, and the view from it did not meet the requirements for an artillery aircraft. In addition, the Yak-7 had a long run and run and needed good approaches to the airfield, and also did not have defensive weapons. All these shortcomings were deprived of the Su-2. According to the leading test engineer, 2nd rank military engineer V.Ya. Magon, the machine satisfied "the main and main TTT presented to the spotter without significant structural alterations". The Air Force Research Institute recommended that the Sukhoi aircraft be adopted by corrective units and squadrons as soon as possible.

By the end of September 1941, in Podlipki, under the wing of aircraft No. 070403, 10 guides for PC-132 or RBS-132 missiles (armor-piercing projectile) were mounted. Field tests were successful, but the People's Commissariat of Ammunition produced at that time only standard RS-82 rounds. Sukhoi was given the task to remake the car for them. It was planned that from mid-October, all Su-2s would have attachment points for RSs, and every fourth production aircraft would also have beams for them.

It remains to be seen to what extent the aircraft factories have carried out the very tense plans of the government to increase serial production. Measures taken to include branches in plant No. 135 increased the number of employees at the enterprises to almost 10,000 people. Workers and employees switched to an 11-hour working day without days off. This made it possible to increase the production of aircraft in July to 94 against 62 in the previous month. The quality of the Kharkov machines fully met the requirements of the front. Nevertheless, the operational schedule approved by A.I. Shakhurin could not be fulfilled in July: there was not enough equipment.

On August 3, the State Defense Committee adopted Decree No. 384 "On providing aircraft for the Southern and South-Western fronts." From now on, the director of the Kharkov aircraft plant, I.M. Kuzin, had to transfer all the assembled bombers to the military councils of these associations. By this decree, the Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western Front S.M. Budyonny and a member of the military council of the front N.S. Khrushchev pledged "to provide all possible assistance ... in increasing output". According to the memoirs of veterans, Marshal Budyonny really arrived at the plant, where he met with workers, employees and aviators who were there. In August, 117 Su-2s were transferred to active units - the largest number of vehicles in the entire history of serial production of a bomber.

Meanwhile, the Red Army continued to retreat, the front approached Kharkov, and clouds gathered over the aircraft factory. On the night of September 4, the enemy made the first raid on the city: 11 bombers dropped fragmentation and incendiary bombs from under the clouds, including captured Soviet Rrabs. About 30 factory workers were injured. During the second strike on the night of September 7, the enemy used large land mines. Wanting to make the task easier for the Luftwaffe crews, the Germans transmitted a provocative order over the VNOS network to searchlight batteries to illuminate the aircraft factory, but they managed to unravel the enemy's plans.

Despite the shelling and bombing, the daily production of Su-2 in early September increased to four, which corresponded to the adjusted government task. All daylight hours did not leave the cockpit pilots-Kharkovites A.I.Kalyuzhnov, G.Ya.Korobko, P.I.Deev and others. Right at the factory airfield, after flying over, the cars were handed over to military crews. Big role fighters of the 146th IAP played in the cover of the plant and the adjacent territory. Since September 11, 22 MiG-3s have been on duty around the clock, not allowing the enemy to interfere with the work of Kharkovites. The enemy failed to disrupt the planned evacuation of the enterprise. When the Soviet troops were forced to leave Kharkov on October 25, the released Su-2 bombers flew to the rear airfields in a timely manner. The 146th IAP was late with the relocation and 112 people, led by the battalion commissar Cherenkov, died and went missing.

Events in Dolgoprudny near Moscow developed not so dramatically. Here, with the beginning of the war, they carried out a small modernization of the 4th series bombers and prepared a new standard for the Su-2. At the end of June 1941, aircraft No. 070T29 was tested at the Air Force Research Institute, on which most of the defects previously noted in the test materials were finally eliminated. The results of the work carried out were encouraging.

But the leadership of the Dolgoprudny plant in the summer of 1941 could not establish a rhythmic production, create the necessary backlog of parts. Moreover, the existing machine park was only half loaded. As a result, in July, Plant No. 207 handed over 12 vehicles to the military, and the next month - only eight Su-2s, i.e. the plan was completed by only a third.

Repeatedly, the senior military representative of the plant, military engineer 2nd rank A.M. Medvedkov, drew the attention of management to poor planning and lack of accounting, which led to frequent downtime. So, on August 7, about 100 people of one of the workshops were not provided with work, and the next day 52 workers were sent to field work at the airfield and 74 - on time off. On August 12, General Zharov, head of the Main Directorate for Armament Orders of the Air Force, turned to Shakhurin with a request to remove director V.P. Gorin and chief engineer of the plant P.S. Kushpel from their posts.

N.V. Klimovitsky was appointed the new director of the 207th. The leader is tough and demanding, he managed to improve production and technological discipline in a short time. The plant increased the output of the Su-2 and was able to build 15 Su-2s in September, including five vehicles in the artillery spotter version and six long-range photo reconnaissance vehicles with an additional gas tank. It was possible to work out the installation of jet weapons, as well as modified photo installations AFA-1 and NAFA-19-No one could then assume that the work rhythm of the team would be disrupted very soon. The unexpected breakthrough of the Germans to Moscow forced the Evacuation Council to give an order to relocate the Dolgoprudny plant, along with other enterprises in Moscow and the Moscow region, to the East. On October 8, it was decided to evacuate plant No. 207 to Perm, where it would be merged with plant No. 135.

This decision tried to challenge the leadership of the aircraft factory. Already on October 10, director N. Klimovitsky, chief engineer V. Tairov, who were supported by the party organizer of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks V. Egorov and senior military representative A. Medvedkov, appealed to Stalin and Malenkov with a request to keep the plant as an independent production unit. They offered to evacuate the plant to Tashkent, to the base of the local repair plant, promising in this case already in January. 1942 to double the program for the production of combat aircraft. But, as far as is known, there was no reaction to this appeal.

Evacuation of all industrial enterprises took place under difficult conditions. The factories that produced the Su-2 were no exception. So, the first echelon from Kharkov to Molotov arrived on October 1, and the last - only on December 4, 1941. Incomplete loading of equipment under enemy fire and lack of Vehicle during unloading, the installation of equipment was delayed. And the management of engine plant No. 19, on whose area the production of Su-2 aircraft was relocated, turned out to be not ready to receive a huge economy: the buildings of the workshops transferred to aircraft builders were cleared and freed from the remnants of motor equipment only after the intervention of the authorized NKAP.

It must be borne in mind that they were restoring the enterprise, as they said then, "based on the merger into a single production and economic unit"- Plants No. 135, 207, a branch of Plant No. 450, the fuselage shop of the Sickle and Hammer plant, as well as Gidroprivod, the production part of OKB-289 and the woodworking shop. Already by the beginning of November, a giant had emerged, numbering 1763 pieces of equipment, of which 1114 were metal cutting machines(for comparison: in Kharkov by the autumn of 1941 there were about 800 metal-cutting machines). At the same time, there were less than half of the required number of workers.

Having considered the state of affairs in Molotov, evaluating the "bottlenecks", People's Commissar A.I. Shakhurin in early November ordered the production of 70 Su-2 M-82s by the end of 1941, and in December to produce three vehicles per day. The Germans were then standing a hundred kilometers from Moscow, and it was necessary to overcome the crisis associated with the evacuation as quickly as possible. The People's Commissar considered it possible by November 15 to install and put into operation in Perm all the equipment exported here.

In these difficult conditions, it turned out that somewhere along the way the drawings of the VMG M-82 for the Su-2 disappeared and they had to be hastily restored. It was also necessary to introduce various substitutes for scarce materials, primarily aluminum and copper. Extensive correspondence was conducted between different departments on the question of who would make skis for Sukhoi bombers. On November 18, Deputy Head of the Main Directorate of the Air Force, Y.L. Bibikov, turned to Shakhurin with a proposal to produce every fifth aircraft in the version of reconnaissance and spotter, “due to the fact that the Red Army Air Force does not have such aircraft, and the need for them for the front is very large” . And suddenly…

On November 19, 1941, the State Defense Committee heard in Kuibyshev the director of plant No. 135, I.M. Kuzin, who reported on the difficulties associated with the restoration of aircraft production. It became clear that by the end of the month the front would not receive a single Su-2. According to the secretary of the Molotov Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, N.I. Gusarov, it was not possible to create a single production team from the workers of various evacuated enterprises. After a heated discussion, the GKO adopts two resolutions. The first talks about the need to install and work out the promising M-82 engine on TB-7, "103", IL-2 and DB-3F aircraft. There is not a word about the Su-2 in the document, although already in September the first two serial Su-2 M-82s were assembled at the plant in Kharkov, and in Molotov there was a good start for the production of these machines. The text of the second decree turned out to be even more severe for P.O. Sukhoi: Plant No. 135 must immediately start production of the Il-2 with the M-82 engine, while the production of the Su-2 was stopped.

It is difficult to unequivocally answer the question why the management made such a decision. Apparently, the main reason was associated with a decrease in the number of types of combat vehicles that were in production, and the equipment necessary for them. There is no doubt that favorable reviews about the work at the front of the regiments on the Su-2 were late. At the same time, in November, aviation commanders and pilots highly appreciated the effectiveness, survivability, unpretentiousness of Ilyushin's attack aircraft. Many military experts then believed that the best aircraft to support the troops is hard to imagine. Now, if only to make the IL-2 double, so that the shooter had a movable machine gun ...

Contrary to popular belief, initially S.V. Ilyushin opposed the conversion of the attack aircraft into a two-seater, but agreed to place the gunner in a car with an M-82 engine. Such an aircraft was built, and at the beginning of September 1941, they began to test it. The concept of interaction in battle was developed between the two-seat leader Il-2 M-82 (they were often called then Il-4) with several single-seat Il-2 AM-38.

In accordance with government instructions, on December 20, the Perm plant received the drawings of the Il-4, and the next day, preparations for a new production began. Director Kuzin was allowed to complete the Su-2 only from the available backlog. When it turned out that the restructuring of production in Perm was proceeding unacceptably slowly, and it would not be possible to assemble the Il-4 in the coming months, Shakhurin limited the production of the Su-2 only to machines located in the assembly shop. Many people perceived such a decision with bewilderment, and the commander of the 135th BAP, Major G. Korzinnikov, even wrote a report to the head of the Main Directorate of the Air Force, where he substantiated the undesirability of stopping the construction of the aircraft, which had proven itself at the front in recent months.

In the history of our aircraft industry, there were cases when a car was taken out of production and then restored again. But in this case, having made sure that building Ilyushin attack aircraft in Perm was inexpedient, the country's leadership decided - an unprecedented step for the beginning of 1942 - to disband plant No. 135. In January and February, aircraft factories Nos. 30 and 381 were strengthened at the expense of the personnel and equipment of this enterprise.

According to the memoirs of the oldest employee of the Design Bureau M.I. Zuev, such a decision was influenced by Stalin's dislike for Pavel Osipovich. After the death of V.M. Petlyakov in the crash on January 12, 1942, Sukhoi was summoned to the Kremlin and received an offer to lead the work on improving the Pe-2. Sukhoi did not refuse, but he did not agree either. Stalin did not like the hesitation of Pavel Osipovich and on January 14, with his knowledge, AI Izakson was appointed to the position of chief designer of plant No. 22.

After another 10 days, an order was issued: to disband the aircraft factory in Molotov. Sukhoi was not allowed to return to Podlipki even when the Nazis were driven away from Moscow. It turned out that the BB-1 (Su-2) aircraft saw the light with the direct participation of the leader, and he also stopped its mass production.

But the history of the use of the Su-2 did not end there. In the cold and snowy winter of 1941-1942, the activity of hostilities was low. To ensure at least one flight, it was necessary to start the engines two or three times a night and, long before dawn, begin to prepare the aircraft for launch. In frost and cold, mechanics kindled blowtorches, and then they heated the oil coolers with their help. The crew also experienced difficulties: the snow cover made it difficult for the pilot to calculate for landing, and for the navigator to navigate. Most of the flights were made by the most trained crews, since the Su-2 was difficult to pilot in the clouds.

The navigators switched to bombing not "on the lead", as was practiced in the summer, but with individual aiming. Often the planes went on the attack, repeatedly changing course, and five to seven kilometers before the target, they suddenly turned sharply, which made it difficult for the enemy to counteract. In February, in the 97th BAP, ten guides for launching the RS-82 were mounted on several bombers and rocket weapons were tested in battles on the Bryansk Front. After several successful sorties, the pilots were twice thanked by the commander of the Air Force of the 3rd Army, Lieutenant General G.P. Kravchenko. He also demanded from the command of the 97th BAP and the entire flight crew "to achieve maximum efforts in the restoration of the material part". Indeed, the number of serviceable aircraft in the regiment was calculated in units. Aviators showed the greatest activity on March 2, making 14 sorties with five aircraft. By the beginning of March, there were only four serviceable Su-2s in the 209th BAP, which was fighting a little to the south.

By the spring of 1942, aviators of the 103rd, 210th, 211th, 226th and 227th BAPs had finished their combat operations on the Su-2. Most of the pilots underwent retraining on the Il-2 attack aircraft and positively perceived the transition "from plywood to cast iron." In some assault regiments, Sukhoi aircraft were used as training aircraft for working out landing techniques on the Il-2 - after all, two-seat training attack aircraft were not yet produced at that time. The navigators subsequently served in training and combat day bomber aviation regiments, most often in Pe-2 aircraft.

In the winter of 1942, another one was added to the dryer regiments operating at the front - in February, the 826th BAP, Major A.M. Bokun, was trained in Molotov. The unit had 16 vehicles with M-88B engines and four brand new aircraft with M-82 engines. On the last Su-2 (plant No. 11114, 12116, 07117 and 35117), it was decided to conduct military tests of A.D. Shvetsov's engines. The crews positively evaluated the modified version of the Sukhoi machine and the M-82 engines, in particular. But during the training and during the flight to the front in the period from February 28 to March 9, there was one disaster, one accident and many forced landings due to the fault of the engine (in total, in reserve regiments and training centers in 1941-1942, Su-2 vehicles 6 accidents and 17 accidents are unpleasant numbers, but the flight time per serious flight accident turned out to be 25-30% more than for Pe-2 or Il-2 aircraft.)

Continuing to use the Su-2 in the role of close bombers, the command of the Red Army Air Force in March decided to start forming corrective units, and then squadrons. The Air Force Maintenance and Repair Department received an order to collect Su-2 aircraft from forced landings, repair and send them to the 10th reserve regiment, which was relocated to Kamenka-Belinskaya. The crews trained there received 23-24 hours of flight and about 100 hours of ground training. There were special requirements for spotter pilots: according to the instructions, each aviator had to have a flight time of at least a hundred hours.

However, the situation at the front did not allow the process of retraining to be delayed, and soon the first four corrective links with a dozen Su-2s departed for the Western Front. By the summer of 1942, 77 crews were trained and sent to the active army, of which 52 flew the Su-2, and the rest flew the Curtiss O-52 imported reconnaissance aircraft. The constant shortage of serviceable Su-2s slowed down the work of the 10th ZAP. In addition, P.O. Sukhoi was instructed to stop all further work to improve the Su-2 spotter. Nevertheless, in April-May, it was possible to prepare the first two, staffed by the state, corrective squadrons - the 12th KAE for the Leningrad and the 13th KAE for the Kalinin fronts.

It was difficult, with long delays, the state tests of the Su-2 M-82 were going on. A lot of time was spent on working out the VMG. Only on April 22, 1942, a team of testers headed by the leading engineer A.V. Sinelnikov began to draw up a report. Pilot Captain S.M. Korobov performed 35 flights on the machine. He made most of them with a ski chassis. However, neither the skis nor the increased takeoff weight affected, according to the Air Force Research Institute, the behavior of the aircraft in the air. Even without the use of afterburner, the Su-2 M-82 flew at low and medium altitudes much faster than with the M-88B. At the same time, the range of the car decreased and the anti-boot angle on landing became insufficient - 18.5 ° with the required minimum of 26.5 °, which made it dangerous to use the brakes on the run.

By April 22, almost all pilots of the 826th BAP managed to fly around the modified vehicle. The greatest experience was gained by Captain V.Galushchenko, who added another 11.5 hours to the Su-2 M-82 to 211 hours of flight time on the Su-2 M-82, and Lieutenant V.I. Dostalev (173.5 hours + 11.8 h). Both pilots, as well as the regiment commander, Major A.M. Bokun, managed to complete more than a hundred sorties on dryers by May 1942.

In the early days of the Soviet offensive on Kharkov, ground troops supported 374 bombers of various types, which were part of the Air Force of the Southern and Southwestern Fronts. Of the 92 bombers suitable for daytime operations, there were 42 Su-2s in the 13th Guards, 52nd, 135th, 288th and 826th BAPs. At the beginning of the operation, the crews flew out two or three times to bomb the enemy troops, ensuring the breakthrough of tanks and cavalry. However, timely redeployment of aviation after the advancing units was not organized. With each passing day, interaction with fighters and ground troops was getting worse. The number of sorties dropped sharply for several reasons. So, Colonel I.P. Gorokhov, who replaced V.I. Artamonov in command of the 288th BAP, ordered the pilots not to take off without fighter cover after a pair of Messerschmitts burned three dryers on takeoff from the Aleksandrovka airfield. The 40th IAP, attached to the bombers at the beginning of the operation, was based at a great distance and could not cover them, since the range of the I-16 fighters was not enough, and the 762nd IAP located in Aleksandrovka on LaGG-3 did not receive a task to escort the Su-2.

The 97th BAP, which fought on the Bryansk Front, lost almost all Su-2s during the bombing at the Yelets airfield in May. The remaining vehicles and personnel reinforced the 209th BAP. This unit, together with other regiments of the Air Force of the front, had to repulse the German summer offensive that began on June 28 under incredibly difficult conditions. In the battles on the outskirts of Voronezh, strong and active Luftwaffe fighter aircraft inflicted heavy losses on many of our regiments, but the 209th BAP retained its combat capability.

The assault regiments that fought side by side with the Su-2 either suffered heavy losses (the 503rd ShAP), or had many out-of-service aircraft (the 218th and 874th ShAP). But the aviators of the 209th BAP also had a hard time in the conditions of retreat. Suffice it to say that the regiment began fighting as part of the 208th night BAD, then it was quickly subordinated to the 205th air division, and in mid-July 1942 it was introduced into the 223rd BAD. By September, 20 Su-2s remained in the unit. All crews performed from 55 to 170 sorties on this type; 83 people were awarded orders and medals.

An even more intense battle unfolded in July-August 1942 on the distant approaches to Stalingrad. Dwelling on the features of the combat use of Su-2 aircraft, let's say that some crews of the 826th BAP began to "put on board" a third person - the bottom gunner. In one of the battles, an anti-aircraft projectile jammed the left aileron, and Messerschmitts attacked the damaged car of foreman Savelyev. The fighters tried to approach from below, but the unexpected fire of foreman Grekov allowed the crew to repulse the attacks. The pilot managed to land the damaged bomber in the field.

In some sorties, it was necessary to organize the interaction of the Su-2 M-88, which withstood two or three overhaul, with brand new Su-2 M-82. The difference in their maximum speeds at low and medium altitudes reached 100 km/h. The speeds of the aircraft almost leveled out after the suspension under the wings of the "Molotov" machines of VAPs (pouring aviation devices). In the summer of 1942, ampoules with a mixture of KS were widely used - they effectively hit the enemy's manpower and equipment.

The crews of the Su-2 solved another problem throughout the war. We are talking about dropping leaflets in Russian and German over enemy-occupied territory. The intensity of such work increased in July. Up to 45 thousand leaflets were scattered from aircraft over the cities occupied by the Nazis in just one month. They talked about the enormous losses of the Nazi troops on the Soviet-German front, reported on the beginning of powerful allied air raids on German cities, and also cited the text of the Anglo-Soviet cooperation treaty. At the height of summer, German "hunter" fighters began active flights in our near rear. The best aces of the Luftwaffe from the squadrons JG / 3, / 52, / 53, / 77 caused enormous damage to our aircraft with unexpected attacks. In the conditions of treelessness, the steppe scorched by the sun, it was not easy for Soviet pilots to hide from the persecution of the Messerschmitts. In early July, several Su-2s were shot down by the enemy during takeoffs and landings, and several more were destroyed on the ground. In order to somehow secure their airfields in the face of a shortage of anti-aircraft weapons, the regimental commanders ordered to organize the duty of shooters-scorers at the MV-5 turrets at a time when the unit was not flying sorties.

During the summer battles on the Don, the 52nd BAP became one of the best in the aviation of the Stalingrad Front. In May, the regiment received the last 22 Su-2 M-82s manufactured in Molotov. The machines were originally intended for the female 587th BAP, which was formed by M.M. Raskova, but she preferred the more modern Pe-2s. Having quickly mastered the modified machines, the aviators of the 52nd were grateful to fate that they again had to fight on the creation of P.O. Sukhoi. Almost all veterans of the regiment spoke of the Su-2 with exceptional warmth. According to them, it was an unpretentious, reliable soldier aircraft. Many times the cars arrived with shots, and even with cut-off parts of the stabilizers, rudders, but were restored by the technical staff and a few days later went into battle again.

The documents noted that well-trained crews detected small-sized, well-camouflaged targets, such as, for example, pontoon crossings sunk several tens of centimeters under water, delivered well-aimed strikes and at low level evaded the pursuit of enemy fighters. In other cases, on the contrary, single bombers climbed to a height of up to 8000 m. An entry in the combat log of the 270th BAD stated that "at these heights, German fighters did not catch up with Su-2 aircraft and attacked only on a collision and intersecting courses". This fact can be explained by the rich experience of the crews, their ability to mask themselves with clouds, as well as the insignificant activity of the Luftwaffe fighter aircraft at high altitudes in the summer of 1942 - after all, the maximum speed of the Bf-109F and Bf-l09G was still at least 100 km / h more than the Su-2 M-82.

For the whole of 1942, German fighters and anti-aircraft guns shot down 64 Su-2s, of which eight were the irretrievable losses of the 8th Air Army during the defensive period of the Battle of Stalingrad. On average, in the 270th BAD, each Su-2 had time to complete 80 sorties before being written off in July - August, and Pe-2 - only 20. Of course, it would be an exaggeration to say that Sukhoi aircraft are several times better than "pawns or Bostons. We must not forget that among the flight personnel of the 52nd and other regiments on the Su-2, there were quite a few aviators who had excellent training, flight experience from the pre-war period. But the combat vehicles have now implemented everything that the designer laid in them.

By the autumn of 1942, the number of Su-2 air regiments fighting at the front was reduced to two. In addition to the 288th BAP operating on the Southern Front, the 52nd Regiment continued combat operations on Stalingrad. IN last part in early July 1942, the surviving vehicles from the 13th Guards were handed over. and the 826th BAP, and in early September - from the 135th BAP. Despite this, in the 52nd BAP there were no more than 16 Su-2s in September, of which about half were combat-ready. Each aircraft was now assigned two or three crews. Not only old-type machines with M-88B, with serial numbers No. 22095,55092,1910, but also with M-82 engines, like Nos. 44117, 45118 and 47118, have developed a 100-hour resource. Consequently, it was possible to gain invaluable experience in the long-term operation of A.D. Shvetsov's engines at the front. It is not surprising that in September, in Verkhnyaya Akhtuba, bomber pilots helped the pilots of the 287th Lieutenant Colonel S.P. Danilov in mastering the first production La-5s - as you know, the M-82 engine was also installed on S.M. Lavochkin's fighters.

It would seem, well, what could a few Sukhoi bombers mean on the scale of the front at the end of 1942? Meanwhile, in inclement weather, some crews managed to cause significant damage to the enemy. During the counteroffensive of our troops near Stalingrad, which began at the end of November, single Su-2s were successfully camouflaged in the clouds and almost always flew without fighter cover. The “hunter” crews bombed enemy locomotives, motor vehicles, and airfields with virtually no losses. In one of the sorties, the "drying" was mistakenly attacked by red-star fighters, but they also could not shoot down the plane. The Su-2 crews brought very valuable information about the German-Romanian troops from raids behind enemy lines to a depth of 200-250 km.

Five - seven serviceable Su-2s were available at the end of autumn in the 288th BAP, headed by Major I.I. Bautin. It must be borne in mind that the number of the entire bomber aviation of the 5th Air Army rarely exceeded fifty aircraft, and each serviceable aircraft was on the account. According to the report of the senior engineer of the 288th BAP, most often the Su-2 was idle due to the lack of wheel chambers. Mechanics even tried, though unsuccessfully, to adapt car tires to the bomber. We were looking forward to the repaired cars from the workshops of Grozny ...

It is curious to note that at the end of 1942, Sukhoi aircraft practically ceased to be written off from among the active ones. Much more quickly than, say, a year ago, the cleaning of damaged aircraft from emergency landing sites, their transportation to repair facilities, as well as the dismantling of emergency aircraft and engines into component parts, sorting into good and bad ones, and sending them to their destination were organized. If in the first year of the war 48 Su-2s went through maintenance and refurbishment, then in the second year - at least 568 Sukhoi aircraft. Some "dryers" ended up in workshops and rembazas more than 20 times!

In mid-November, 41 spotters of this type were already operating on different fronts, of which 34 were combat-ready. Most of the Su-2s - 13 units - were in the 34th and 45th separate KAE fighting near Stalingrad. The latter, led by Captain N.N. Korolev, made 26 sorties without loss in January 1943, of which 8 were associated with artillery fire adjustment, 14 with visual reconnaissance, 2 with photographic reconnaissance, and 2 sorties had to be interrupted due to bad weather. Sometimes the aviators managed to correct the fire of the 1st artillery division of the RGK General V.N. Mazur on seven targets at the same time. After the victory on the Volga, the squadron received the honorary title of the 1st Guards.

During the breakthrough of the blockade of Leningrad, the personnel of the 12th separate KAE distinguished themselves, providing the work of the artillery corps of the breakthrough of the reserve of the Supreme High Command of General Zhdanov. The command believed that the gunners could not suppress the long-term firing points of the enemy so effectively without the "prompt" of the pilots. Patched - repatched Su-2s accelerated no faster than up to a speed of 275 km / h (according to the instrument), but kept perfectly in the air.

Among the shortcomings in the organization of hostilities, the gunners noted the long preparation of data for firing - the crews of the Su-2 had to be above the front line for more than an hour. Often the escort fighters returned home, having used up all the fuel, and the spotters had to take an unequal battle with the Messers and Fokkers. So, on June 23, 1943, the crew of the 1st GvKAE died near the town of Kholm: pilot st. lieutenant A.L. Dmitrienko (93 sorties) and navigator senior lieutenant N.I. Kukushkin (101 sorties). From archival documents it followed that at the beginning of the war, Dmitrienko acted uncertainly and once mistakenly even dropped bombs on his troops. Subsequently, having perfectly mastered the Su-2, having learned to fight on it, he became one of the most trained pilots of the 97th, then the 209th BAP, and later the 45th KAE.

The Germans quickly realized what a threat slow cars pose. Just as the Soviet fighters sought to shoot down the FW-189 spotters, their German opponents hunted our artillery planes. According to the testimony of the pilot of the 54th GvIAP Ya.L. Mikhailik, the FW-190s sought to shoot down the Su-2 with sudden attacks from a dive. It was very difficult for the escort fighters to protect them from powerful fire. For example, on June 28, 1943, the Yak-1 four managed to save the spotter, although the Yakovlev from the 55th GvIAP burned down from enemy fire. On the eve of the fighting on the Kursk Bulge great job performed by the crews of the 16th and 47th KAE (respectively in the areas of Arkhangelskoye - Kamenka and Kamenka - Saburovo), which were part of the 16th Air Army. They regularly reported to the command of the ground forces about the activities carried out by the enemy on the front line.

Even after the withdrawal of the 52nd BAP from the front to Petrovsk-Saratovsky (15th ZAP) at the end of 1942 and the transfer of the remaining nine Su-2s to the correction squadrons, there were always not enough aircraft for the latter. On the other hand, the aviators of the 52nd BAP significantly strengthened the 14th and 15th KAE, 14 pilots by this time had made from 93 to 244 (!) sorties on the Su-2. 21 navigators and 65 technicians had no less experience.

The absence of new Su-2s forced the Air Force command in the spring of 1943 to start forming corrective squadrons on Il-2 aircraft. Despite the fact that S.V. Ilyushin modified the attack aircraft's communications equipment, he failed to eliminate a number of machine defects, and above all, the tightness of the rear cockpit. According to the letnabs, the Ilys did not provide them with the necessary convenience of work, but by the summer of 1943, corrective squadrons were sent to the front only on them. In the meantime, until the end of 1943, the 53rd and 54th KAE, led by senior lieutenants I.I. Kasatkin and A.I. Shvetsov (both veterans of the 52nd BAP), successfully fought on the Su-2. Major Shvetsov subsequently formed and led the 187th separate reconnaissance regiment, with which he reached Victory. But not a single Su-2 in the ranks of the regiment survived by 1944. According to the documents of the 42nd KAE, on November 27, 1943, one of the last Su-2 No. 263105 in service was shot down by a German ace from behind the clouds.

Back in early March 1943, the 288th BAP was withdrawn from the front to Mozdok for understaffing and mastering combat operations by crews at night. All vehicles were equipped with RSB-Zbis communication radios, RPK-10 radio semi-compasses, and NAFA-19 night photo installations. However, retraining dragged on and was overshadowed by disaster. On the night of June 3, 1943, during a training flight in the light of searchlights, the crew of the Hero of the Soviet Union G.G. Nikolaev (navigator - A.N. Petrov) crashed. The leadership of the regiment had to make great efforts to overcome the "photophobia". After several sorties at the end of this summer, the command of the 4th Air Army, which included the regiment, decided to disband the 288th BAP, and transfer the personnel to the 650th night BAP.

Headed by Major A.S. Kutsenko, the 650th BAP became the thirteenth and last regiment that fought on Sukhoi aircraft (in addition, at least 12 reconnaissance and correction squadrons and 18 units operated on the Su-2; separate machines were used by 90- th RAE, 8th ORAP, 205th IAD, headquarters of the 6th VA and other units). For effective and selfless sorties during the fighting in the Kuban, a unit in August 1943 was awarded the Order of the Red Banner, after which two squadrons were re-equipped on the Su-2, and the third continued to fight on the P-10. In the battle over the "Blue Line" in September - October, the crews of the Su-2 pilots N.N. Malega and G.P. Lepaev especially distinguished themselves, successfully using their machines at night. From the airfield, the Slavyanskaya Regiment supported our sailors during the Kerch-Eltigen landing operation, inflicting significant damage to enemy transport in the Crimea.

But the time of the Su-2 was ending. In January 1944, the 650th BAP handed over a few of the remaining vehicles and two months later completed the rearmament on the Pe-2. It is symbolic that the regiment became part of the 188th BAD of Colonel A.I. Pushkin, who made a significant contribution to the development and successful use of Sukhoi aircraft. Let's say a few words about other heroes who fought on the Su-2.

Forever MP Odintsov remembered the eighth sortie. After hitting an enemy crossing on July 3, 1941, enemy fighters “they didn’t leave a single living place on the plane”. The pilot and navigator were seriously injured. The plane somehow kept in the air and Odintsov was able to land it safely at his airfield. Mikhail Petrovich remembered that it took 11 bandages to bandage him. After two strikes by the squadron of the 210th BAP led by Lieutenant I.L. Karabut on the front line of the enemy on September 29, 1941, the commander of the 96th Infantry Division defending here praised the actions of our aviators on the Su-2 "above any praise."

Navigator M.A. Lashin demonstrated enviable skill in many sorties. So, on March 23, 1942, his crew flew out to reconnoiter enemy troops. Meanwhile, a group of He-111s, covered by Bf-109s, approached the Korocha airfield, where the 135th regiment was then based. Noticing a lone Soviet aircraft, the leading Messerschmitt chased it, but was hit by Lashin's well-aimed burst and made an emergency landing at the location of the airfield maintenance battalion.

The commander of 9 / JG52, Lieutenant K. Schade, who had considerable experience in training and combat work, was captured. Hitler's ace managed to shoot down 27 Soviet aircraft, and the German aviators identified the lone Soviet aircraft that he so unsuccessfully attacked as "armored Il-2". By the way, on August 27, 1942, the commander of another detachment, 8 / JG52, Lieutenant O. Decker, was also shot down after he unsuccessfully pursued the Su-2. Our pilot dodged the Messer's bursts at low level, firing from a machine gun, until, finally, one of the soldiers in the trenches managed to hit the oil cooler of a German fighter with a rifle. It was possible to capture not only the German commander, but also the latest Bf-109G No. 13529, which became a valuable trophy of the Red Army Air Force.

The Soviet command considered the raid of five Su-2, led by Art. lieutenant V.A. Verholantsev, to the Kursk railway station on May 1, 1942. Despite strong anti-aircraft fire, our bombers accurately hit the target. The enemy warehouse broke out - the fire raged for three days. “Operating on the Stalingrad front from August 1, 1942 to January 5, 1943, Art. lieutenant I.N. Martynenko performed the most important tasks of the command, such as the detection of airfields and reconnaissance of defensive lines ", - noted in the award material. The pilot made 37 such sorties.

On the night of July 25, 1943, Captain K.Ya. No less successful were night raids on the Novorossiysk pier in the late evening of August 15 and ships in the port of Kordon on the night of November 6, 1943. In each of these cases, the crews recorded numerous explosions and fires at the location of the enemy.

Occupied with other work, Sukhoi did not leave his attention to the Su-2 aircraft even after the termination of its serial construction. On his initiative, in July 1942, new M-82FN engines with direct fuel injection into the cylinders were installed on two machines (Nos. 25095 and 26096). Despite the accident of the second aircraft on August 5, 1942, Pavel Osipovich succeeded in continuing the tests. After fine-tuning the VMG, it became clear that the new engine promises great prospects. The work turned out to be very useful for our aviation. Recall that only in the summer of 1943 did success come to the La-5FN with the same engine.

In December 1942, Pavel Osipovich proposed to subject the Su-2 to serious alterations by installing the M-71F engine with a take-off power of 2200 hp on a well-developed airframe. With. In the project, which received the designation BB, the fuselage structure was redesigned, the armor was strengthened and the wing area was increased by changing its shape in plan. This work, as well as the Su-2 project in the version of the attack aircraft, was not approved by the Deputy People's Commissar for Experimental Aircraft Construction A.S. Yakovlev.

Designed in 1935-1936 and created in prototypes at the Ivanov competition in 1937, P.O. Sukhoi's short-range bomber was built in a large series from 1940 to 1942. Factories produced 893 vehicles, of which approximately 30 were equipped with M-87A or B engines (before the war, most of them were re-equipped with more powerful M-88B engines), 58 had M-82 engines, and the rest - M-88 and M-88B . We emphasize that Pavel Osipovich installed on prototypes of his machines not only the engines listed above, but also Shvetsov's M-62, M-63, M-63TK, M-81, M-82FN, Urma M-87, M-89 - many of them at that time did not go beyond the scope of experimental work.

The crews especially noted such advantages of the Su-2 as a spacious, comfortable, warm cockpit in any cold weather, good visibility for the pilot and navigator for single-engine aircraft. The ability to control the machine from the navigator's cockpit simplified the process of retraining the flight crew and proved to be an invaluable advantage in the event of injury or death of the pilot. Aircraft were widely used at the front in the first year of the war in the role of close bombers, reconnaissance aircraft and attack aircraft. True, for the last role, the Su-2 turned out to be poorly prepared and the dryer regiments suffered heavy losses. The surviving aircraft were used at the front until the beginning of 1944, mainly as scouts and spotters. They proved to be very useful in the conditions of Soviet air supremacy.

Summing up, we can say that the Su-2 aircraft did not become the most successful design of Sukhoi. It was followed by an excellent Su-6 attack aircraft, for which the designer was awarded the Stalin Prize of the 1st degree, Su-9 and Su-11 fighters, Su-7B fighter-bombers and many other machines that left a much greater mark on the history of our aviation. For a number of reasons, the Su-2 bomber did not become a mass-produced aircraft. The real "Ivanov" of the Soviet Air Force was the Il-2 attack aircraft, which entered service in ever-increasing quantities. It replaced the Su-2 in many roles and was widely used in the vast majority of operations in the Great Patriotic War.

The design of the serial aircraft BB-1 with the engine M-88 (M-88B).

The design of the aircraft is mixed: the fuselage and keel are wooden, all other units remain metal.

A distinctive feature of the design was the transition from steel welded assemblies and parts to similar ones made of high-strength aluminum alloys, which allows their mass production by cold and hot stamping (from AK-1 material) and casting (from 195T4 and AK material) with little mechanical finishing. .

Welding followed by heat treatment was used only in the design of the chassis, crutch, motor mount, as well as in weapons elements.

The design provided for aggregate assembly with the installation of controls and equipment before final assembly, which made it possible to use the in-line assembly method with access to the conveyor.

The mechanization of the manufacture of parts, drilling of holes along the conductors ensured the interchangeability of parts without any additional adjustment. The use of open profiles not only simplified the assembly of elements and entire units, but also made it possible to mechanize the riveting process. Thanks to the pressed profiles, the wing and tail skin began to work not only in shear, but also in compression. The increased role of the skin made it necessary to pay special attention to the edging of various cutouts and hatches caused by the needs of assembly and operation. For this reason, a number of hatches were made not on locks, but on bolts with anchor nuts.

The monocoque-type fuselage with load-bearing skin, all-wood, consisted of 20 frames interconnected by four spars and several stringers, sewn up with plywood sheathing - shell.

The first 19 frames are all-wood, the 20th of mixed construction. It consisted of two parts: the upper, made of plywood, and the lower duralumin. After the stabilizer was installed, both parts were connected by two duralumin profiles, on which two elevator brackets and two stabilizer suspension brackets were attached. On frame No. 20 mounted tail wheel.

Four fuselage spars were made in the form of beams from rails of variable section with a decrease towards the tail section. There were two plateaus in the upper part of the fuselage. The front box-section plateau served to connect the upper spars and to attach the rear screen turret. Next was the rear plateau, above which was placed the rear folding fairing. When using the turret, the fairing could be lowered. The pilot's duralumin floor consisted of two horizontal and one inclined slabs.

To view the lower hemisphere in the navigator's cockpit, one porthole was installed along the sides of the fuselage. There were also steps along the sides of the fuselage to support the navigator's legs. In the rear fuselage there was a hatch designed for emergency evacuation of the aircraft and the installation of a hatch installation.

The fuselage skin was made of birch veneer 0.5 mm thick, pasted on a special blank, which had the shape of a fuselage. The veneer was pasted at an angle of 45° to the aircraft axis. The thickness of the fuselage skin was variable. After gluing the shell onto the frame and eliminating irregularities, the fuselage was pasted over with a harsh awning and painted.

The cockpit was closed with a convex streamlined plexiglass canopy and a high sliding canopy, providing excellent visibility in all directions. The movable part had a window on the left side, moving back on the guides. Full shifting of the canopy back provided the pilot with free exit from the cockpit.

Behind the oblique rear section of the pilot's cockpit lantern, the navigator's turret fairing was fixed, which consisted of a fixed and folding parts. The folding visor could be deflected all the way forward and locked - in this position, the navigator had the opportunity to get into the cockpit.

Both cabins were heated. Air heating in them was provided by a special pipeline laid along the starboard side of the aircraft. Air was supplied to the pipeline from the flame tube of the exhaust manifold. At the request of the crew, fresh air could be injected into the cabin through the same pipelines.

The wing differed from the wing of the SZ-2 aircraft in the way the fairing was attached between the center section and the fuselage. The center section frame consisted of two spars, six ribs and two longitudinal walls. In the toe behind the second spar, there were stringers in the form of angular profiles above and below.

On the trailing edge of the center section, from below, there were landing flaps (two sections), which were attached to the rear wall of the center section and had a constant chord. Sheathing - duralumin, cold-worked, 0.6 mm thick. In the shields under the fuselage there were windows for viewing down from the navigator's cockpit.

The frame of each wing console consisted of two spars, 17 ribs, a rear wall, stringers and additional beams in the machine gun compartment. All elements of the frame, with the exception of a few nodes, were made of duralumin.

To mount the tank on the lower surface of the wing, a large hatch was made, which was closed with a lid in the form of a panel. The panel was attached to the ribs and spars with screws and self-locking nuts.

The detachable part of the wing, as well as the center section, was sheathed with smooth cold-worked duralumin sheets. The thickness of the skin is from 1.0 to 0.6 mm. The riveting of the skin along the toe to the first spar and along the upper surface from the first to the second spar is countersunk, the rest of the skin was riveted with rivets with lenticular heads.

The frame of each aileron consisted of a tubular duralumin spar, stamped sheet ribs, a bow stringer and a tail profile. The toe of the aileron was sheathed with a thin duralumin sheet to stiffen it. The entire aileron was covered with canvas. A tube with lead was placed in the toe of the aileron, which served as weight compensation. The wing ailerons deflected 25° up and down. The left aileron had a controlled trimmer.

The design of the shields, located on the consoles from the aileron to the connector, is similar to the center section.

The longitudinal set of plumage consisted of four walls of channel section, extruded profiles and corners; transverse - from split sheets of ribs. Sheathing and the entire stringer set are duralumin.

Six cast brackets were attached to the rear wall of the stabilizer, necessary for the suspension of the elevator. The stabilizer was installed motionless at an angle of -5 ° and was bolted to the corners that bordered the cutout in the fuselage for the stabilizer. The connection was sealed. In addition, the stabilizer was bolted to the fuselage tail frame with two middle brackets.

The elevator had weight compensation. Its two halves were interchangeable and connected by a pipe passing through the fuselage tail fairing. The frame of the elevator consisted of a pipe-spar with tail ribs strung on it. The bow of the steering wheel was sheathed with duralumin, and the entire surface was covered with a cloth. A trimmer was hung on a ramrod in the tail section of each half of the steering wheel.

The keel of all-metal construction consisted of two box-section spars, stringers and ribs; its sheathing was plywood. On the rear spar there were two brackets for the suspension of the rudder.

The rudder trimmer, as well as the elevator, consisted of a channel section profile, to which the skin was riveted, reinforced with several ribs, a loop and an eye for the trimmer control rod.

Aircraft control is double, mixed. The elevator, ailerons and flaps had a rigid control wiring, and the elevator, trim tabs and crutch had a cable. From the second cockpit it was possible to turn off the elevator control.

The shields were controlled by a hydraulic cylinder through a system of rods and rockers. They deviated at an angle of 55 ° when landing.

The mechanism for cleaning and releasing the chassis is electro-hydraulic. The main racks are the same as on the SZ-2.

The crutch installation had an automatic stop in the neutral position after the separation of the tail of the aircraft from the ground. It automatically retracted simultaneously with the main racks. The crutch wheel could turn on the ground 42 ° in each direction.

To ensure winter operation, all serial aircraft were supplied with a set of skis produced by factories No. 135 and 207, as well as the Moscow factory No. 2 of Narkomles. In flight, the skis of the main struts were retracted and adhered to the lower skin of the center section. These skis consisted of a skid (plywood glued to ash or oak planks), three box-shaped spars, nine frames, two side ribs, four stringers, plywood sheathing and aluminum sheet edging. The ski had dimensions of 2700 × 650 mm.

Crutch ski in flight adjacent to the lower surface of the fuselage. To attach the shock absorber to the fork, the ski had a boar with a sleeve into which the fork axle was inserted. On top of the ski, in front and behind, two shock absorbers-cords were attached. The crutch ski consisted of two solid pine spars and two side ribs. The ski run consisted of ash planks. The entire ski was edged with sheet aluminum. Tail ski dimensions 615 × 290 mm.

When mounting the skis, the wheels were removed along with the axles, and the skis were fixed at the bottom of the shock strut using a traverse. Instead of summer shields, winter shields were installed.

The propeller group consisted of a two-row star-shaped 14-cylinder M-88 (M-88B) engine with a nominal power of 950 hp at the ground. With. The engine was equipped with a three-bladed propeller with a variable pitch VISH-23 with a diameter of 3.25 m. The propeller fairing consisted of front and rear parts interconnected by screws and anchor nuts. Fairings were made of sheet duralumin. A heat-treated steel ratchet was riveted to its front to start the engine from an auto starter.

The engine hood had inner and outer parts, as well as a skirt. The outer hood was made in the form of three removable covers inserted into the groove of the V-shaped profiles and fixed only on the motor using the front and rear assemblies.

The hood skirt was divided into three sectors - two side and bottom. The side sectors had six wings each. They were connected by hinges and guide sheets made of stainless steel. The sashes, when the skirt was fully opened, retained the shape of the hood, blocking the gaps between the sashes. In the right side sector there was a cutout in two flaps for the engine exhaust pipe.

From above, behind the hood between the spars, a removable panel was fixed to approach the fuselage fuel tank.

A carburetor suction pipe tunnel was attached to the lower part of the hood, and an oil cooler with an air intake tunnel was installed behind it in the skirt area. The incoming air was controlled by a damper.

Small arms included three ShKAS machine guns, two of which were fixedly placed in detachable wing consoles outside the rotor rotation zone. To approach the machine guns in the upper surface of the wing there were hatches. The fire control of the wing machine guns was carried out with the help of triggers located on the control stick of the aircraft.

The upper turret of the MV-5 remained unchanged, as on the SZ-2 aircraft, and the hatch installation was removed from the aircraft.

Bombs with a caliber of 8-100 kg were hung on cluster holders in the fuselage bomb bay, under the cockpit. The normal bomb load was 400 kg, and the maximum was 600 kg. The internal suspension did not exceed 400 kg. 100 and 250 kg bombs could be hung on external bomb racks under the wing.

Equipment. The external communication of the aircraft was carried out using a radio station of the RSB "Dvina" type, which was installed in the second cockpit in front of the navigator. All units of the radio station were easily removed and mounted on the frame shelf, using rubber shock absorbers of the "Lord" type.

The radio station was equipped with a rigid single-beam T-shaped antenna, stretched from the bow rod to the keel. As a rule, radio stations on bombers were filmed. They were left on aircraft that performed reconnaissance and artillery fire adjustment tasks.

The AFA-13 camera was installed at the starboard side of the navigator's cabin. In the stowed position, it could be secured to the side with a latch.

In these storerooms of the Monino Museum, I wandered around this plane for a long time, trying to understand what it was !!! My knowledge was clearly not enough, but with the help of books I managed to identify it: Su-2. I could not find anything about this particular aircraft !!! Maybe someone has information? It slipped on the Internet that the same plane was seen in 1989 in Volgograd, then in the same year at Khodynka. Is it a model or is it still an aircraft?

As always, I use information from sites
http://www.airwar.ru
http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki
and other sources found by me in the internet and literature.

In the second half of 1936, on the instructions of the Main Directorate of the Aviation Industry (GUAP), the design teams of N.N. Polikarpova, I.G. Nemana, S.V. Ilyushin, S.A. Kogerigina, D.P. Grigorovich and P.O. Sukhoi conducted preliminary research on the projects of reconnaissance attack aircraft with the AM-34FRN piston engine.
back view

The SUAI commission reviewed the projects and decided that they were very close, and decided to build the aircraft in three design options: duralumin, wooden and mixed. For each of the options, the chief designers were appointed: P.O. Dry, I.G. Neman and N.N. Polikarpov.
On December 27, 1936, a resolution of the Council of Labor and Defense “On the construction of a high-speed long-range reconnaissance attack aircraft” was issued, later mentioned in correspondence under the code “Ivanov”.

Continuing work on the topic, at the beginning of 1937 P.O. Sukhoi redesigned the project for the M-62 air-cooled engine, as it was more reliable in combat conditions. In the design of the new aircraft, extruded profiles, stamped and cast power units made of aluminum alloys, flexible textolite were widely used, and the use of the plasma-template method made it possible to simplify the manufacture of the aircraft and made it possible to mass-produce it.

The development and construction of a prototype was carried out in a record short time - 6 months. August 25, 1937 M.M. Gromov lifted into the air the first copy of the aircraft SZ (Stalin's task) -1 (aka ant-51). Factory tests with interruptions caused by engine breakdowns continued until the end of 1938. The aircraft was not transferred to state tests due to the ban on the operation of M-62 engines.

In December 1937, the construction of the “understudy” (SZ-2) was completed, the aircraft made its first flight on January 29, and it was immediately transferred to joint tests with the Air Force. The tests were completed on March 26, the aircraft turned out to be successful and was recommended for serial construction.
cockpit: What the flight crew liked most about the aircraft was the warm, enclosed cockpit. "In winter, at least fly in a T-shirt, not like on the R-5, where the frost penetrates to the bones!"

For various reasons, "Ivanov" I.G. The Neman was not completed, and N.N. Polikarpov took to the air only at the end of 1938. This meant that "Ivanov" P.O. Sukhoi was the winner of an unannounced competition. After the completion of state tests, the SZ-2 entered the plant number 156 to replace the engine, which had exhausted its resource. Only a few flights were made with the new engine, and on August 3 the plane crashed, the cause of which was the destruction of the M-62 engine.

The third copy of the SZ-3 aircraft was lifted into the air in November 1938 by test pilot A.P. Chernavsky. The M-62 motor was replaced with a more powerful and high-altitude M-87. The capacity of the gas tanks was reduced from 930 to 700 liters, and the ammunition load of the wing machine guns was increased to 850 rounds for each. According to the pilot A.L. Chernavsky, the take-off run of the new car was reduced and the glide slope became steeper. Before the delivery of the SZ-3 for state tests, the military demanded that the M-87 be replaced with a more reliable M-87A, but the latter also failed after three flights on November 25. According to its flight characteristics, the aircraft fully satisfied the Air Force. But only at the end of July 1939, at the plant in Kharkov, they began preparing for the serial production of the aircraft under the designation BB-1 (near bomber - the first). At the same time, P.O. Sukhoi was appointed Chief Designer of Plant No. 135.

Unlike prototypes, the production aircraft had a mixed design (the fuselage was a wooden monocoque with plywood sheathing, the wing and stabilizer were metal). The latter was explained in detail by the fact that the USSR still did not have enough metal for a large series of all-metal aircraft.

gunner's place: MV-5 or MV-5m turret?

In 1940, the BB-1 (from December 1940 - Su-2), having undergone a number of improvements, began to be produced with the M-88, M-88B engines, and the last production aircraft, about 60 copies, had the M-82 engine.

In addition, in 1940, factories No. 31 in Taganrog and No. 207 in Dolgoprudny were connected to the production of the aircraft. In total, until the spring of 1942, 910 Su-2 aircraft were produced.

In the period 1939-41. in parallel with mass production in the Design Bureau P.O. Sukhoi, work was underway to modify the aircraft. A number of aircraft projects with improved flight and tactical characteristics were developed, which included improving its aerodynamics, equipping it with new engines (M-63TK, M-81, M-89, M-90), etc.
devices at the shooter drawn

The Su-2 began to enter service with the Air Force units in the second half of 1940. By the beginning of World War II, the Su-2 aircraft fleet in the Air Force consisted of 213 copies. Until 1944, according to various sources, from 14 to 17 short-range bomber aviation regiments, more than 12 reconnaissance and correction squadrons and 18 units armed with Su-2 aircraft took part in combat operations.

Having made 5,000 sorties on the Su-2 in 1941, the Soviet Air Force lost only 222 of these aircraft in combat and went missing, 22.5 sorties for one loss. At the same time, the average combat irretrievable losses of Soviet bombers in 1941 amounted to 1 aircraft per 14 sorties, that is, they were 1.61 times more.

In units that were armed with Pe-2 and Su-2 at the same time, significantly lower losses of the latter were also noted, despite the formally better performance characteristics of Petlyakov’s machines: the combat losses of the Pe-2 are determined at 1 loss per 32 sorties, and for the Su-2 at 1 the loss accounted for 71 sorties. This difference can be explained by the fact that the Su-2 had an air-cooled engine, which was much more durable than the liquid-cooled engines that were on most Soviet bombers and, in particular, on the Pe-2

A distinctive feature of the design was the transition from steel welded assemblies and parts to similar ones made of high-strength aluminum alloys, which allows their mass production by cold and hot stamping (from AK-1 material) and casting (from 195T4 and AK material) with little mechanical finishing. .

The crutch installation had an automatic stop in the neutral position after the separation of the tail of the aircraft from the ground. It automatically retracted simultaneously with the main racks. The crutch wheel could turn on the ground 42 in each direction.

The bow of the steering wheel was sheathed with duralumin, and the entire surface was covered with a cloth. A trimmer was hung on a ramrod in the tail section of each half of the steering wheel.

Small arms included three ShKAS machine guns, two of which were fixedly placed in detachable wing consoles outside the rotor rotation zone. To approach the machine guns in the upper surface of the wing there were hatches. The fire control of the wing machine guns was carried out with the help of triggers located on the control stick of the aircraft.

The fuselage skin was made of birch veneer 0.5 mm thick, pasted on a special blank, which had the shape of a fuselage. The veneer was glued at an angle of 45 to the axis of the aircraft. The thickness of the fuselage skin was variable. After gluing the shell onto the frame and eliminating irregularities, the fuselage was pasted over with a harsh awning and painted.

engine: layout? The propeller group consisted of a two-row star-shaped 14-cylinder M-88 (M-88B) engine with a nominal power of 950 hp at the ground. With. The engine was equipped with a three-bladed propeller with a variable pitch VISH-23 with a diameter of 3.25 m. The propeller fairing consisted of front and rear parts interconnected by screws and anchor nuts. Fairings were made of sheet duralumin. A heat-treated steel ratchet was riveted to its front to start the engine from an auto starter.

The cockpit was closed with a convex streamlined plexiglass canopy and a high sliding canopy, providing excellent visibility in all directions. The movable part had a window on the left side, moving back on the guides. Full shifting of the canopy back provided the pilot with free exit from the cockpit.
Behind the oblique rear section of the pilot's cockpit lantern, the navigator's turret fairing was fixed, which consisted of a fixed and folding parts. The folding visor could be deflected all the way forward and locked - in this position, the navigator had the opportunity to get into the cockpit.

Both cabins were heated. Air heating in them was provided by a special pipeline laid along the starboard side of the aircraft. Air was supplied to the pipeline from the flame tube of the exhaust manifold. At the request of the crew, fresh air could be injected into the cabin through the same pipelines.

The wheels of the first production vehicles had insufficiently strong flanges, which collapsed after 15-20 landings. By the beginning of January 1941, 27 Su-2s could not take to the skies in the 135th bap due to broken wheels. There was also a lack of spare tires. Operational tests of the reinforced landing gear wheels showed that they began to correspond to the flight weight of the aircraft. By the beginning of April, the factory team had replaced several sets of chassis shock struts, which had withstood three hundred landings.

The unit cost is 430,000 rubles, but this is average, and at some plants the cost price reached up to 700 thousand rubles

Aircraft control is double, mixed. The elevator, ailerons and flaps had a rigid control wiring, and the elevator, trim tabs and crutch were cable-wired. From the second cockpit it was possible to turn off the elevator control.
The shields were controlled by a hydraulic cylinder through a system of rods and rockers. They deviated at an angle of 55 when landing.
The mechanism for cleaning and releasing the chassis is electro-hydraulic.

Equipment. The external communication of the aircraft was carried out using a radio station of the RSB "Dvina" type, which was installed in the second cockpit in front of the navigator. All units of the radio station were easily removed and mounted on the frame shelf, using rubber shock absorbers of the "Lord" type.

The radio station was equipped with a rigid single-beam T-shaped antenna, stretched from the bow rod to the keel. As a rule, radio stations on bombers were filmed. They were left on aircraft that performed reconnaissance and artillery fire adjustment tasks.

The AFA-13 camera was installed at the starboard side of the navigator's cabin. In the stowed position, it could be secured to the side with a latch.

Aeronautical equipment provided flights in adverse weather conditions.

Su-2 Su-2 * Crew: 2 pers. * Cruise speed: 459 km/h * Maximum ground speed: 430 km/h 370 * Maximum speed at altitude: 486 km/h 455 * Range: 910 km 890 * Service ceiling: 8400 m * Rate of climb: 588 m/min 400 * Length: 10.46 m * Height: 3.94 m * Wingspan: 14.3 m * Wing area: 29 m² * Empty weight: 3220 kg 2995 * Curb weight: 4700 kg 4335 * Engines: ASh-82FN M -88B * Thrust: 1330 hp 1000 * Cannon armament: 4 x ShKAS fixed and 2 x ShKAS mobile * Ammunition: 3400 for fixed machine guns and 1500 for mobile * Bomb load: 400 kg * Suspended weapons: 10 NURS RS-82 or RS-132
It was the Su-2 (from the 211 BAP) that turned out to be the first aircraft on the account of the future Soviet ace and Air Marshal A. I. Pokryshkin - he shot him down (by mistake) on the first day of the war, June 22, 1941

The history of the development of Soviet military aviation in the pre-war period is a vivid example of a fierce struggle between design opinions and concepts for the use of combat aviation. Despite the fact that by the mid-1930s the Red Army Air Force was considered perhaps the most numerous in the world, in operational and tactical terms, Soviet aviation was a cumbersome and clumsy mechanism. There was no clear idea of ​​the role and place of aviation on the battlefield. There was an unspoken division into fighter and bomber aviation. As a result of the implementation of such a concept, the USSR had the most numerous fighter and bomber aircraft. Aircraft capable of performing reconnaissance functions, used as a short-range light bomber or attack aircraft, were not at the disposal of the Soviet Air Force at that time.

The scale of the problem was understood not only by the pilots themselves. At the very top, among the top military leadership, they were aware that in modern conditions the armed forces need an aircraft that can operate directly over the battlefield. The way out of this situation was to be a short-range bomber - an aircraft that at any time could be retrained as a reconnaissance aircraft or attack aircraft. An aircraft designed by Pavel Sukhoi Su 2 could become such a machine. It could have become, but did not! Wartime conditions mercilessly intervened in the fate of this machine, which quickly put an end to the promising combat aircraft.

The country needs a short-range bomber

Despite the fact that the Soviet Union entered the Great Patriotic War with the largest air force, the quality of Soviet combat aviation left much to be desired. The technological gap with the German Luftwaffe was especially noticeable during front-line aviation, which began to play a crucial role in conducting ground military operations. German Yu-87 dive bombers became a real scourge for the Soviet troops in the first, most difficult years of the war. Dive-bombers literally hung over the battlefield, destroying the defenses of the Soviet troops, striking at army units during redeployment and deployment. On the part of the Soviet Air Force, the use of such tactics could not be successful due to the lack of a sufficient number of close bombers and attack aircraft.

A small number of fully combat-ready and adequate Su 2 machines designed by Sukhoi could not radically change the situation at the front. The Soviet pilots' lack of experience in using bomber aircraft as a means of direct fire support for ground forces also had an effect. In addition, this type of aircraft with the outbreak of hostilities, due to objective and subjective reasons, ceased to be produced. The Red Army Air Force was forced to solve operational and tactical tasks using long-range bomber aircraft. The Il 2 attack aircraft was produced in insufficient quantities and could not influence the situation at the front with its presence.

The Su-2s, which were called BB-1s, were used in aviation units in a limited and extremely inefficient way. Over time, when the Soviet pilots gained precious combat experience, when the tactics of using front-line aviation were developed, there was no longer such a machine as the Su - the “second” in the Air Force. A wonderful aircraft, the process of creating which was perhaps the most thorough and scrupulous, lit up only for a moment, leaving an insignificant mark on the history of Soviet aviation.

How it all began

By the mid-1930s, in fact high level it was decided to start work on the creation of a multi-purpose aircraft capable of performing three functions at once - reconnaissance, short-range bomber and attack aircraft. Even a government plan for 1936-37 was born, which provided for the development of a front-line aircraft that meets the following requirements:

• small takeoff weight;
• high power supply;
• good visibility;
• high cruising speed;
• powerful small arms, permissible bomb load of at least 500 kg.

Such requirements had to be met by an aircraft, which at that time was not part of the Red Army Air Force.

The legendary Il-2 attack aircraft was only then in the head of the aircraft designer Sergei Ilyushin. The designer began work on the project only in 1938, on his own initiative. In addition, the very concept of the Ilyushin aircraft was radically different from the generally accepted practice. The main goal of the designer was to create an attack aircraft, a machine with a strictly defined functionality that could perform assault functions on the battlefield.

And then, in 1936, the army just needed a short-range multifunctional aircraft. Design bureaus and organizations headed by the masters of Soviet aviation Tupolev and Polikarpov took part in the competition to create a new machine. It was required to create a car on the basis of a draft design of a new M-34 engine designed by A. Mikulin. In addition, the project was supposed to implement the ideas of creating a multifunctional aircraft.

The team led by A. Tupolev was the first to prepare the project, in which Pavel Sukhoi was involved in the development of all the draft and design documentation. This aircraft designer had vast experience in creating aircraft, being one of the leading specialists of the Tupolev school. The project of the new machine was designated ANT-51. There is a legend that the new aircraft was created due to the personal initiative of I. Stalin, therefore, the experimental machines had the corresponding SZ index - “Stalin's assignment”. Whether this is true or not, however, experimental vehicles called SZ-1, SZ-2 and SZ-3 were received for testing.

Even in the design process, it was decided to reorient to work with the M-62 air-cooled engine, which at that time was one of the most reliable Soviet aircraft engines.

In his work, P. Sukhoi immediately used several innovations. The device of the aircraft differed significantly from the traditional scheme, which was practiced in Soviet aviation at that time. The car had a spacious cabin. The lantern provided excellent visibility at all angles, both from the pilot's seat and from the operator's spotter's seat. The car received dual control, which freed the industry from simultaneously producing combat and training vehicles. In addition, in a combat situation, the presence of vehicle controls in place of the second crew member significantly increased the survivability of the aircraft. Attaching great importance to the aerodynamics of his offspring, Pavel Sukhoi decided to make a capacious bomb bay on the plane. As a result, the speed data of the aircraft has significantly increased.

The project involved the construction of a machine entirely of metal, but later this idea had to be abandoned. Soviet aviation industry did not have sufficient production capacity to produce aircraft-grade aluminum in the required quantities. As a result of all the preparatory measures, already at the end of August 1937, the famous pilot Gromov raised the experimental ANT-51 (SZ-1) machine into the air. When the factory tests were going on, recommendations were received from the military regarding the further use of the machine. The aircraft was supposed to perform the functions of a short-range bomber, be used for assault purposes, perform the functions of an air escort, carry out aerial reconnaissance and perform the function of an artillery spotter. The machine was supposed to fly day and night, in difficult climatic conditions, to carry out combat missions in the face of active opposition from enemy fighters.

For these purposes, it was planned to install machine-gun and cannon armament on an experimental vehicle, in shock and defensive versions. The estimated bomb load was 800 kg. At the end of 1937, the second prototype SZ-2 rolled out onto the airfield. At this stage, the car had already been converted into an attack aircraft and a reconnaissance aircraft. It was this machine that entered the State tests, which went on for a month at a training ground in the Crimea. However, the third prototype SZ-3 became the model on which Soviet pilots had to fight. Its trials began in the late autumn of 1938.

A more powerful M-87A engine was installed on the third prototype aircraft. The car had improved aerodynamics, which, together with the new engine, contributed to an increase in flight speed. The third experimental machine has decreased takeoff run. The aircraft became more stable on combat courses. In this form, the car received high marks. The selection committee recommended the Sukhoi aircraft for mass production.

Serial production and baptism of fire Su 2

Plant No. 135 in Kharkov was chosen for serial production. The plans were to launch the production of a new machine at an aircraft plant in Taganrog and in the city of Dolgoprudny near Moscow. However, in the future, the main production was carried out at the Kharkov Aviation Plant. Serial production in Taganrog was curtailed due to the need to produce new LaGG-3 fighters. Plant No. 207 in Dolgoprudny managed to produce a small number of aircraft, which was curtailed due to the rapid approach of German troops to Moscow in the autumn of 1941.

Later, when the full production cycle was restored at the plant, it was decided to switch to the production of Pe-2 dive bombers.

An interesting story with Kharkov aircraft factory No. 135. The production of the new aircraft in Kharkov began in January 1939 and continued for two and a half years, until October 1941. After that, due to the danger of German occupation, the plant's capacities were evacuated to Perm. The release of the short-range bomber (BB-1) or Su 2 was discontinued. In total, 893 vehicles left the Soviet factories, of which 785 units were assembled at the Kharkov Aviation Plant.

The subsequent resumption of the assembly of the bomber in Perm was considered inappropriate. The plant refocused on the production of the Su-3 fighter. In the future, only Yakovlev-designed aircraft began to roll off the assembly line of this airline.

Modernization and modification of the aircraft

It is important to note that Sukhoi and his team of designers did not sit idly by, content with the results achieved. In the Design Bureau, painstaking work was constantly going on to improve the prototype, taking into account the experience of military operations in Spain and Poland, where the Wehrmacht was truly able to use its assault squadrons. Combat experience in the use of front-line aviation has clearly shown that the time of light bombers is irretrievably gone. Aircraft operating in close contact with ground formations needed good protection and more powerful weapons. Over time, this concept was implemented in the design of the Ilyushin Il-2 attack aircraft.

Sukhoi did not have time to finalize his aircraft. History gave too little time for this machine, which turned out to be an intermediate, transitional type, from a dive bomber to an attack aircraft. Attempts to convert the Su 2 into an attack aircraft were unsuccessful. Unlike the scheme used in the Ilyushin Design Bureau, in which the vehicle's armor served as a supporting structure, Sukhoi simply sheathed the most important places in the structure with armor. This inevitably led to an increase in the flight weight of the machine. The flight characteristics of the aircraft dropped significantly. Even the use of a more powerful M-88 engine did not give a sufficient increase in the flight characteristics of the machine. It was necessary to strengthen the onboard armament of the aircraft, but the design of the aircraft did not give a wide field of activity for this.

Similarly, the attempt to convert the Su 2 into a close-range dive bomber was a failure. In creating a dive bomber capable of acting like the German Yu-87, the Soviet designers missed one important aspect. In the Luftwaffe, the tactics of conducting dive bombing were thoroughly worked out. In the Soviet Union, this method of piloting aircraft was not fully mastered. It was irrational to create a machine capable of carrying out work on targets from a dive, when the aircraft would later be used as a conventional bomber. Moreover, at the disposal of the command of the Air Force of the Red Army there were already projects for a dive bomber designed by Petlyakov.

The situation in which Sukhoi's close bomber found itself was a stalemate. The country urgently needed fighters and attack aircraft. The production of Pe 2 dive bombers was increasing. There was no place for the Su 2 aircraft in this cohort. The aircraft that entered service with the flight units continued to fight until 1944. Of the 837 vehicles that came to equip the Soviet Air Force, up to 50 vehicles were lost during the battles near Moscow, Kharkov and Stalingrad. About 200 aircraft were out of action due to technical malfunctions. The aircraft remaining in the flight units were gradually decommissioned due to the lack of the necessary repair base.

combat experience

As soon as the first cars began to roll off the factory assembly line, the Air Force began re-equipping the aircraft fleet. During the winter - spring of 1941, the pilots of 6 bomber aviation regiments moved to the Su 2. During the first half of 1941, more than 400 Su 2M-88 and Su 2M-87B modifications were delivered to combat units. The largest number of new aircraft accounted for parts of the Kharkov Military District. Probably in this case, the proximity of production facilities affected.

The second in terms of the number of new aircraft - 91 aircraft, was the Kiev Special Military District. This was followed by the Western OVO - 64 aircraft and the Odessa Military District - 22 aircraft.

By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Air Force surpassed the German Luftwaffe in the number of close bombers. The Germans were able to put up only 324 Ju-87 dive bombers to participate in Operation Barbarossa. In terms of the number of aircraft, the Germans were inferior, but in terms of the concentration of bomber regiments in the direction of the main attacks and in the skill of controlling air operations, the enemy's advantage was unconditional.

The active hostilities that began on the Eastern Front led to major losses in the material part of the bomber regiments. The main losses include aircraft destroyed by the German Air Force during the first strikes on the airfields of military districts on the Western border. In the future, the main article of losses falls on the actions of German fighter aircraft.

In the absence of clear interaction with ground units and without proper air cover, Su 2 aircraft turned out to be ineffective. In a direct combat collision with German fighters, the chances of the Su 2 crew were significantly reduced. The car was poorly protected from the effects of ground-based air defense systems. The anti-aircraft machine-gun fire of the enemy became an obstacle for Soviet short-range bombers when operating in the front line.

Despite this, the Sukhoi car remained the most massive short-range bomber of the Red Army Air Force in the first, most difficult period war. Serial production of cars ceased in the winter of 1940.